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15 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**  
16 **FOR THE COUNTY OF VENTURA**

17 ERIC ZARAGOZA, individually, and on behalf  
18 of other members of the general public similarly  
19 situated,

20 Plaintiffs,

21 vs.

22 THE ARC OF VENTURA COUNTY, INC., a  
California corporation; and DOES 1 through  
23 100, inclusive,

24 Defendants.

Case No.: 56-2022-00565343-CU-OE-VTA

*Assigned for all purposes to the Honorable  
Jeffrey G. Bennett, Dept. 21*

**PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND  
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY  
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND  
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM  
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN  
SUPPORT THEREOF**

Date: August 10, 2023  
Time: 8:30 a.m.  
Dept.: 21

Complaint Filed: May 5, 2022  
Trial Date: Not Set

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**TO THE HONORABLE COURT, AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS  
OF RECORD:**

**PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on August 10, 2023 at 8:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as may be heard in Department 21 of the above-entitled court, located at located at 800 South Victoria Avenue, Ventura, California 93009, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769, Plaintiff Eric Zaragoza (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move the Court for entry of an order granting preliminary approval of the proposed Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement entered between Plaintiff and Defendant The Arc of Ventura County, Inc. (“Defendant”). Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of S. Emi Minne in support of Motion for Preliminary Approval (“Agreement” or “Settlement”);
2. Approving the proposed Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”) attached as Exhibit A to the Agreement, and the proposed deadlines for the settlement administration process;
3. Approving the opt-out and objection procedures set forth in the Agreement and Class Notice;
4. Provisionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes;
5. Appointing Plaintiff as the Class Representative for the Class for settlement purposes;
6. Appointing S. Emi Minne and Jill J. Parker of Parker & Minne, LLP and Edwin Aiwazian, Arby Aiwazian, Joanna Ghosh, and Yasmin Hosseini of Lawyers for Justice, PC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
7. Appointing Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the Settlement Administrator;
8. Directing Defendant to furnish the names, last known mailing address, social security numbers, and start and end dates of active employment as a non-exempt employee of Defendant in the State of California for all Class Members to the Administrator no later than 21 days calendar after the Court grants preliminary approval of the Settlement, as well as any other information the

1 Administrator may reasonably require to administer the Settlement;

2 9. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

3 Good cause exists for the granting of this motion as the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate,  
4 and reasonable. Additionally, the proposed notice process complies with California Rules of Court,  
5 Rules 3.766 and 3.769, and mailing the proposed Class Notice to the Class Members' last known  
6 addresses is an appropriate form of giving notice.

7 Pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699(1)(2), a copy of the proposed Settlement, as well as  
8 information regarding the preliminary approval hearing on this matter, were submitted to the  
9 California Labor Workforce Development Agency via online filing at <https://www.dir.ca.gov/Private-Attorneys-General-Act/Private-Attorneys-General-Act.html> on July 14, 2023. See Minne Decl. ¶ 64,  
10 Exh. 6.  
11

12 The motion is based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities; the  
13 Declaration of S. Emi Minne and exhibits thereto; the Declaration of Yasmin Hosseini; the Declaration  
14 of Eric Zaragoza; the Declaration of Jodey Lawrence on behalf of Phoenix Class Action  
15 Administration Solutions; the pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this matter; and  
16 any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

17 Respectfully submitted,

18 Dated: July 17, 2023

**PARKER & MINNE, LLP**

19  
20 By: \_\_\_\_\_

  
S. Emi Minne  
Attorneys for Plaintiff  
ERIC ZARAGOZA

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 This is a putative class and representative wage and hour action brought by Plaintiff Eric Zaragoza  
4 (“Plaintiff”) against Defendant The Arc of Ventura County, Inc. (“Defendant”) on behalf of Defendant’s  
5 current and former non-exempt employees. By way of this Motion, Plaintiff seeks preliminary approval of a  
6 non-reversionary Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (“Settlement” or “Agreement”)<sup>1</sup>,  
7 which will resolve the Action in its entirety. The key terms of the Agreement are as follows:

- 8 • Size of the Class: approximately 396 individuals.
- 9 • Gross Settlement Amount: \$1,500,000.00, exclusive of employer payroll taxes.
- 10 • Settlement Administration Costs: estimated not to exceed \$10,000.00.
- 11 • Requested Class Representative Enhancement Payment: \$10,000.00.
- 12 • Requested Attorney’s Fees and Costs: \$525,000.00, plus costs not to exceed \$30,000.00.
- 13 • PAGA Penalties: \$50,000.00, 75% of which will be paid to the LWDA, with the remaining 25% paid  
14 to PAGA Members.
- 15 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: \$875,000.00.
- 16 • Average Estimated Individual Class Payment: \$2,209.60.
- 17 • Average Estimated Individual PAGA Payment: \$50.81.

18 As set forth herein, the Agreement is the product of informed discovery, arms-length  
19 negotiations by experienced counsel, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the  
20 Class. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that the Court enter an order granting preliminary  
21 approval of the proposed Settlement.

22 **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

23 Defendant is a non-profit organization that provides programs and services to assist individuals  
24 with intellectual and developmental disabilities. (Minne Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff was employed by  
25 Defendant from approximately July 2013 to August 2015 and from September 2016 to September  
26

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>1</sup> The Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration  
of S. Emi Minne in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement  
 (“Minne Decl.”).



1 2018 as a non-exempt, hourly-paid day program instructor. (*Id.*, ¶ 4; Declaration of Eric Zaragoza  
2 [“Zaragoza Decl.”], ¶ 3.)

3 On May 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in the Ventura County Superior Court  
4 entitled *Eric Zaragoza v. The Arc of Ventura County, Inc.* (Ventura County Superior Court Case No.  
5 56-2022-00565343-CU-OE-VTA, hereinafter “Action”). The original complaint alleged a single  
6 cause of action for Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., predicated  
7 on violations of California Labor Code sections 201, 202, 204, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 1174, 1194, 1197,  
8 1197.1, 2800 and 2802. (Minne Decl., ¶ 5.)

9 Shortly after the Action was initiated, Plaintiff’s counsel met and conferred with Defendant’s  
10 counsel regarding the potential for resolution of the Action. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.) Pursuant to these discussions,  
11 the Parties agreed to exchange informal discovery, engage in private mediation, and stay formal  
12 discovery pending the completion of mediation. (*Id.*) Consistent with the Parties’ agreement,  
13 Defendant provided Plaintiff’s counsel with extensive informal discovery prior to mediation, which  
14 included a 25% sampling of Class Members’ time and payroll records. (*Id.*, ¶ 7.) The sampling was  
15 randomly selected and included employees across the Class Period. (*Id.*) Defendant also provided  
16 Plaintiff’s counsel with all versions of Defendant’s employee handbooks in use during the Class  
17 Period, samples of on-duty meal period agreements signed by Class Members, and other documents  
18 evidencing its relevant wage and hour policies and procedures. (*Id.*) Finally, Defendant provided  
19 Plaintiff’s counsel with key data points regarding the size and composition of the Class, such as the  
20 number of Class Members and PAGA Members (including the number of current versus former  
21 employees), the total number of workweek and pay periods worked by Class Members, the number of  
22 pay periods worked by PAGA Members, and the average rates of pay for the Class. (*Id.*)

23 Prior to mediation, Plaintiff’s counsel thoroughly reviewed the informal discovery produced  
24 by Defendant, which included consulting with an expert to analyze Class Members’ time and payroll  
25 records for potential wage and hour. (*Id.*, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s counsel also engaged in further independent  
26 investigation, and conducted further legal research regarding the merits of Plaintiff’s claims and  
27 Defendant’s potential defenses thereto. (*Id.*) Based on this investigation and informal discovery,  
28 Plaintiff’s counsel prepared a detailed and informed assessment of Defendant’s potential liability in

1 advance of mediation. (*Id.*) Plaintiff’s counsel also extensively briefed the strengths and weaknesses  
2 of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s anticipated defenses, and provided their analysis to the mediator  
3 for his consideration. (*Id.*)

4 After completing a thorough investigation and analysis of Plaintiff’s claims, on April 18, 2023,  
5 the Parties attended a formal mediation with Paul Grossman, Esq., a neutral and respected mediator  
6 with extensive experience in complex wage and hour matters. (*Id.*, ¶ 9.) The Parties engaged in a full  
7 day of negotiations, during which the Parties debated their respective positions and exchanged views  
8 regarding the strengths and weaknesses of their claims and defenses. (*Id.*) The settlement discussions  
9 were at all times at arm’s length and, although conducted with appropriate professional decorum, were  
10 adversarial. (*Id.*) Plaintiff and his counsel went into mediation willing to explore the potential for a  
11 settlement of the Action, but were also prepared to litigate Plaintiff’s claims through class certification,  
12 trial, and appeal if a settlement was not reached. (*Id.*) Following a full day of negotiations, the  
13 mediation culminated in the issuance of a mediator’s proposal, which was accepted by all Parties. (*Id.*)

14 On April 21, 2023, Plaintiff provided notice to the California Labor & Workforce Development  
15 Agency (“LWDA”) and Defendant of his intent to seek civil penalties pursuant to Labor Code §§  
16 2698, et seq. (“PAGA”). (*Id.*, ¶ 10.) On June 26, 2023, after fully exhausting PAGA’s mandatory 65-  
17 day notice period, the Parties filed a Joint Stipulation to allow for the filing of a First Amended  
18 Complaint (“FAC”), which alleges the following eleven (11) causes of action: (1) Violation of  
19 California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 (Unpaid Overtime Wages); (2) Violation of California Labor  
20 Code §§ 226.7 and 512(a) (Unpaid Meal Period Premiums); (3) Violation of California Labor Code §  
21 226.7 (Unpaid Rest Period Premiums); (4) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197, and  
22 1197.1 (Unpaid Minimum Wages); (5) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 (Final  
23 Wages Not Timely Paid); (6) Violation of California Labor Code § 204 (Wages Not Timely Paid  
24 During Employment); (7) Violation of California Labor Code § 226(a) (Non-Compliant Wage  
25 Statements); (8) Violation of California Labor Code § 1174(d) (Failure to Keep Requisite Payroll  
26 Records); (9) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 (Unreimbursed Business  
27 Expenses); (10) Violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.; and (11)  
28

1 Violation of California Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq. (Private Attorneys General Act of 2004). (*Id.*, ¶  
2 11.) The FAC was deemed filed by the ordered on July 3, 2023. (*Id.*)

3 On or about June 28, 2023, after months of further negotiation, the Parties fully executed a  
4 long form Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement. (*Id.*, ¶ 12.)

5 **III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

6 **A. Definition of the Proposed Class and PAGA Members.**

7 For purposes of Settlement only, the Parties have agreed to certify the following class: “All  
8 current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees of Defendant who were employed by  
9 Defendant in the State of California at any time during the Class Period.” (Minne Decl., ¶ 14;  
10 Agreement, ¶ 6) The Class Period commences on May 5, 2018 and ends on July 17, 2023. (Minne  
11 Decl., ¶ 15; Agreement, ¶ 7.) There are approximately 396 Class Members. (Minne Decl., ¶ 15.)

12 The Settlement also includes a subgroup of “PAGA Members” which consists of all current  
13 and former non-exempt employees of Defendant who were employed by Defendant in the state of  
14 California at any time during the PAGA Period. (Minne Decl., ¶ 16; Agreement, ¶ 22.) The PAGA  
15 Period commences on May 5, 2021, and ends on July 17, 2023. (Minne Decl., ¶ 16; Agreement, ¶ 24.)  
16 There are approximately 246 PAGA Members. (Minne Decl., ¶ 24.)

17 **B. Gross Settlement Amount**

18 The Parties have agreed to settle the Class and PAGA claims at issue in the FAC for Gross  
19 Settlement Amount of \$1,500,000.00. (Minne Decl., ¶ 18; Agreement, ¶¶ 15, 49.) The Gross  
20 Settlement Amount is non-reversionary, and does not include employer-side payroll taxes, which shall  
21 be separately paid by Defendant. (*Id.*) The Gross Settlement Amount shall be allocated as follows:

- 22 • Attorneys’ Fees to Class Counsel in the amount of 35% of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e.,  
23 \$525,000.00). (Minne Decl., ¶ 19; Agreement, ¶¶ 4, 53.)
- 24 • Reimbursement of Class Counsel’s actual litigation costs and expenses, not to exceed  
25 \$30,000.00. (Minne Decl., ¶ 19; Agreement, ¶¶ 4, 53.)
- 26 • Class Representative Enhancement Payment of \$10,000.00 to each Plaintiff. (Minne Decl., ¶  
27 19; Agreement, ¶¶ 8, 54.)
- 28 • Settlement Administration Costs not to exceed \$10,000.00. (Minne Decl., ¶ 19; Agreement, ¶¶

1 37, 55.)

- 2 • PAGA Penalties in the amount of \$50,000.00, 75% of which shall be allocated to the LWDA,  
3 and 25% of which shall be distributed to PAGA Members. (Minne Decl., ¶ 19; Agreement, ¶¶  
4 21, 56.)

5 The Gross Settlement Amount, less the payments listed above, shall be the “Net Settlement  
6 Amount”, which shall be distributed to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments on  
7 a pro rata basis according to the number of workweeks worked during the Class Period. (Minne Decl.,  
8 ¶¶ 20-21; Agreement ¶¶ 16, 57, 58.) Individual Class Payments shall be allocated as 10% wages  
9 subject to all applicable tax withholdings, 45% interest and 45% penalties not subject to tax  
10 withholdings. (Minne Decl., ¶ 23; Agreement, ¶ 59.) The Net Settlement Amount is currently  
11 estimated to be approximately \$875,000.00. (Minne Decl., ¶ 20; Agreement, ¶ 57.) It is currently  
12 estimated that Class Members will receive an average Individual Class Payment of \$2,209.60. (Minne  
13 Decl., ¶ 22.)

14 In addition to the Individual Class Payments from the Net Settlement Amount, PAGA  
15 Members shall receive a pro-rata share of the 25% portion of PAGA Penalties allocated for distribution  
16 to PAGA Members. (Minne Decl., ¶ 24; Agreement, ¶ 17, 50.) Individual PAGA Payments will be  
17 distributed on a pro-rata basis based on the number of workweeks worked by PAGA Members during  
18 the PAGA Period. (*Id.*) The estimated average Individual PAGA Payment to PAGA Members is  
19 \$50.81. (Minne Decl., ¶ 24.)

20 The Settlement Administrator shall determine the eligibility for, and the amounts of, each  
21 Individual Settlement Award under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. (Minne Decl., ¶ 25;  
22 Agreement, ¶¶ 37, 52, 63) All payments owed under the Settlement shall be disbursed within 28 days  
23 of the Effective Date. (Minne Decl., ¶ 25; Agreement ¶¶ 51-52.) If an Individual Class Payment check  
24 or Individual PAGA Payment check remains uncashed after one hundred eighty (180) days from the  
25 initial mailing, the Settlement Administrator shall transfer the value of the uncashed checks to the  
26 California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Participating Class Member or  
27 PAGA Member. (Minne Decl., ¶ 25, Agreement ¶ 77.) As such, no “unpaid residue” under California  
28 Code of Civil Procedure §384 will result from the Settlement. (Minne Decl., ¶ 25.)

1           **C. Release of Class and PAGA Claims.**

2           Upon the funding of the Gross Settlement Amount and all employer payroll taxes, Plaintiff,  
3 Participating Class Members, and PAGA Members shall be deemed to have released their respective  
4 Released Claims against the Released Parties. (Agreement ¶¶ 30, 83.) The scope of the release is  
5 narrowly tailored to release claims based on facts alleged in the FAC, depending on whether Class  
6 Members elect to opt-out of the settlement and whether such individuals qualify as PAGA Members.  
7 (*Id.*) All Class Members who are PAGA Members will release PAGA claims even if they request  
8 exclusion from the Class. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 31, 84.) In addition to the release of claims made by all Participating  
9 Class Members and PAGA Members, as set forth above, Plaintiff, in his individual capacity, agrees to  
10 a general release of all claims against Defendant. (*Id.*, ¶ 85.)

11           Plaintiff’s counsel is unaware of any other pending matters or actions that assert claims that  
12 will be extinguished to adversely affected by the Settlement. (Minne Decl., ¶ 63.)

13           **IV. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL.**

14           **A. Standard of Review for Preliminary Approval**

15           The review and approval of a proposed class action settlement involves a two-step process. *See*  
16 Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c). First, counsel submit the proposed terms of settlement and the  
17 Court makes a preliminary assessment of whether the settlement appears to be sufficiently within the  
18 range of a fair settlement to justify providing notice of the proposed settlement to class members.  
19 Second, after notice is provided to the class, the Court must conduct a second inquiry into whether the  
20 proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. *Id.*

21           The initial evaluation of a settlement at preliminary approval “is not a fairness hearing.”  
22 *Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of City of Milwaukee*, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled  
23 on other grounds by *Felzen v. Andreas*, 134 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998). Rather, the limited purpose  
24 of this initial inquiry is to determine, at a threshold level, whether the proposed settlement is within  
25 the range of possible approval and, as a result, “whether there is any reason to notify the class members  
26 of the proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing.” *Id.* As set forth below, the  
27 Settlement is within the range of possible approval. Accordingly, preliminary approval should be  
28 granted.

1 **B. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness.**

2 California Courts recognize that a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is  
3 reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow  
4 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the  
5 percentage of objectors is small. *In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal.App.4th 706, 723 (2006); *7-Eleven*  
6 *Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146 (2000). Because the  
7 proposed Settlement was reached through arm’s-length negotiations based on sufficient investigation  
8 and discovery by qualified counsel, it is entitled to a presumption of fairness.<sup>2</sup>

9 1. The Proposed Settlement Was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining.

10 The Settlement was reached following a full day of mediation with Paul Grossman, Esq., a  
11 highly respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and hour litigation. (Minne  
12 Decl., ¶ 9; Declaration of Yasmin Hosseini [“Hosseini Decl.”], ¶ 13.) The settlement negotiations were  
13 at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (Minne Decl., ¶  
14 9; Hosseini Decl., ¶ 13.) The Parties went into settlement discussions willing to explore the potential  
15 for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate its position through class  
16 certification, trial, and appeal if a settlement was not reached. (Minne Decl., ¶ 9; Hosseini Decl., ¶ 13.)  
17 The Settlement was ultimately reached pursuant to a mediator’s proposal which was accepted by the  
18 Parties. (Minne Decl., ¶ 9.) The proposed Settlement was reached at the end of a process that was  
19 neither fraudulent nor collusive. (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 9, 13; Hosseini Decl., ¶ 13.) To the contrary, counsel  
20 for the Parties advanced their respective positions throughout the settlement negotiations. (Minne  
21 Decl., ¶¶ 9, 13; Hosseini Decl., ¶ 13.)

22 2. Plaintiff and His Counsel Conducted Sufficient Investigation and Discovery to  
23 Allow the Court and the Parties Act Intelligently.

24 Courts typically assess the status of discovery in determining whether a proposed class action  
25 settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801  
26

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>2</sup> At preliminary approval, the fourth factor – the percentage of objectors – is not applicable, as notice  
has not yet been provided to the Class and Class Members have not yet had an opportunity to object to  
the Settlement.

1 (1996). As detailed above, prior to reaching the Settlement, Plaintiff’s counsel obtained extensive  
2 informal discovery before the mediation, which included: a representative 25% sampling of Class  
3 Members’ time and payroll documents; all versions of Defendant’s employee handbooks in use during  
4 the Class Period, and other documents reflecting Defendant’s applicable wage and hour policies; and  
5 data points regarding the size and composition of the putative class, total workweeks and pay periods  
6 worked by Class Members and PAGA Members, and the average rate of pay for the Class. (Minne  
7 Decl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s counsel thoroughly reviewed this informal discovery prior to mediation, which  
8 included consulting with an expert to fully analyze Class Members’ time and payroll records for  
9 potential wage and hour violations. (*Id.*, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s counsel also conducted further independent  
10 investigation, and researched Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses thereto. (*Id.*) Based on this  
11 investigation, Plaintiff’s counsel prepared a detailed assessment of Defendant’s potential liability, and  
12 extensively briefed the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s anticipated  
13 defenses prior to mediation. Thus, Plaintiff’s counsel was able to act intelligently and effectively in  
14 negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*; see also Hosseini Decl., ¶¶ 10-13.)

15 3. Plaintiff’s Counsel is Experienced in Class Action Litigation.

16 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.  
17 Plaintiff’s counsel are respected members of the bar with strong records of effective advocacy for their  
18 clients, and are experienced in handling complex wage-and-hour class action litigation. (Minne Decl.,  
19 ¶¶ 55-60; Hosseini Decl., ¶¶ 2-7.) Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims  
20 in this action, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the Class Members.  
21 (*Id.*, ¶ 51; Hosseini Decl., ¶ 15; Zaragoza Decl., ¶ 8.)

22 **C. The Settlement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective**  
23 **Positions and Risks of Continued Litigation**

24 A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at  
25 trial, nor does the settlement have to obtain 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.  
26 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 (2001). In evaluating the  
27 reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court must consider “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk,  
28 expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status

1 through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the  
2 proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the  
3 reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168  
4 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008).

5 Plaintiff’s counsel has carefully considered Plaintiff’s claims and analyzed class-wide  
6 violation rates. Based on information gathered by Plaintiff’s counsel, including calculations of  
7 Defendant’s maximum potential liability exposure and the risks associated with continued litigation,  
8 Plaintiff’s counsel has determined that the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.  
9 (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 27-51.)

10 a. Defendant’s Maximum Potential Exposure.

11 Based on information gathered through discovery, Plaintiff’s counsel estimated that if all class  
12 claims were adjudicated in favor of the Class, Defendant’s maximum potential liability for the Class  
13 claims is \$6,047,718.72 (*Id.*, ¶ 27.) This estimate can be broken down by claim as follows: \$17,174.91  
14 in unpaid overtime compensation; \$75,954.20 in unpaid minimum wages; \$2,266,323.31 in unpaid  
15 meal period premiums; \$1,957,101.30 in unpaid rest period premiums; \$286,965.00 in unreimbursed  
16 business expenses; \$539,400.00 in waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203; and \$904,800.00  
17 in wage statement penalties under Labor Code § 226. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 27-34.)

18 In addition to the damages for the Class claims, Plaintiff’s counsel also separately calculated  
19 Defendant’s potential liability for civil penalties under PAGA to be \$4,165,468.20, which can be  
20 broken down by violation as follows: \$160,492.50 for unpaid overtime; \$320,985.00 for unpaid  
21 minimum wages; \$703,415.70 for meal period violations; \$917,100.00 for rest period violations;  
22 \$917,100.00 for failure to timely pay wages during employment under Labor Code section 204;  
23 \$917,100.00 for failure to maintain required payroll records under Labor Code section 1174; and  
24 \$229,275.00 for failure to reimburse business expenses. (*Id.*, ¶ 35.) These calculations did not include  
25 duplicative penalties that would likely be considered duplicative of statutory penalties recoverable as  
26 part of the Plaintiff’s Class claims, such as waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203 and wage  
27 statement penalties under Labor Code § 226. (*Id.*)  
28



1                   b. Strengths and Weaknesses of Plaintiff’s Claims and Risks of Continued Litigation.

2                   Despite Defendant’s significant potential exposure, Plaintiff’s counsel recognized that there  
3 are significant risks associated with proceeding with this case through class certification, trial, and  
4 likely appeals. As with all class actions, this is a complex case that raises difficult management and  
5 proof issues. Accordingly, there is a significant risk that the Court may deny class certification. While  
6 Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel were confident that Plaintiff’s claims are fundamentally meritorious  
7 and suitable for class-wide resolution, consideration of these risks factored into their decision to enter  
8 into the Settlement at this point in the litigation. (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 36-52.)

9                   For example, a significant portion of Defendant’s estimated liability is based on Plaintiff’s  
10 meal period claim. Plaintiff contends that Defendant unlawfully required Class Members to remain  
11 on-duty during meal periods. Plaintiff further contended that, even when Class Members were allowed  
12 to take duty-free meal periods, such meal periods were delayed past their fifth hour of work, and/or  
13 cut short. Plaintiff’s analysis of Class time and payroll records indicated that meal period premiums  
14 were not paid for these violations. At mediation, Defendant asserted that the nature of the work  
15 performed by a majority of its workforce (i.e., providing direct support services to clients with  
16 disabilities) and the specific legal regulations associated with providing such services, such as  
17 mandatory caretaker to client ratios, prevented employees from being relieved of all duty. Defendant  
18 also provided documents demonstrating that Class Members had signed written on-duty meal period  
19 agreements which were revocable at any time. Defendant also asserted that Class Members’ ability to  
20 take duty-free meal periods varied based on their job position and their assigned clients’ needs, and  
21 that this variation between employees raised highly individualized questions of fact. Defendant  
22 contended that questions of whether such employees had received compliant meal periods, why such  
23 meal periods were not taken, and whether such meal and rest periods were voluntarily waived were  
24 individualized issues that would bar certification. While Plaintiff’s counsel strongly disagreed with  
25 Defendant’s arguments and contentions, their research indicated that trial courts have reached differing  
26 conclusions regarding whether on-duty meal period agreements under similar circumstances were  
27 lawful and/or certifiable, creating significant uncertainty as to whether Plaintiff would prevail on his  
28 meal period claim at class certification and/or trial . (Minne Decl., ¶ 37.)

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Plaintiff’s counsel was also cognizant of the challenges associated with maintaining Plaintiff’s rest period claims on a class-wide basis. Plaintiff contends that Class Members were prohibited from leaving their assigned clients at any time, making it impossible to take duty-free rest periods. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant required Class Members to stay on-site during their rest periods in a manner that violated California law as set forth in *Augustus v. ABM Securities*, 2 Cal.5th 257, 270 (2016). Defendant asserted that Class Members were provided coverage to take rest periods, were free to leave jobsites during their breaks, and that Class Members who worked through their rest periods did so voluntarily. Defendant likewise argued that whether Class Members had received a compliant rest period and the reasons why Class Members failed to receive compliant rest periods raised individualized issues that could not be certified. While Plaintiff’s counsel disagreed with Defendant’s positions, they also recognized that rest period claims are inherently difficult to certify and prove, given that an employer has no obligation to maintain records of rest periods. (Minne Decl., ¶ 38.)

With respect to his minimum wage and overtime claims, Plaintiff alleges that that Defendant failed to pay Class Members all compensation owed due to its practice of rounding time records. Defendant asserted that its rounding policy was neutral on its face and at times resulted in the overpayment of wages to Class Members, and was therefore lawful under *See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 210 Cal. App. 4th 889, 895 (2012). The California Supreme Court recently granted in *Camp* to address the practice of “neutral” time rounding by employers in view of technological advance advances that allow employers to track time precisely. *See Camp v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.*, 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 82 (Feb. 1, 2023, No. S277518). Plaintiff’s counsel is confident that current trends in California jurisprudence indicate that the California Supreme Court will eventually hold that any rounding of time records is unlawful. *See Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC*, 11 Cal.5th 58, 73 (2021); *Troester v. Starbucks Corp.*, 5 Cal.5th 829, 847 (2018); *Camp v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.*, 84 Cal.App.5th 638 (2022). Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s counsel also recognized that law with regard to rounding practices is currently in a state of flux, and that *See’s Candy Shops, Inc.* remains good law for the time being. (Minne Decl., ¶ 39.)

In addition to meal period, rest period, overtime, and minimum wage claims, Plaintiff also contends that Defendant failed to reimburse Class Members for necessary business expenses, such as

1 use of their personal cell phones and vehicles. Defendant asserted that Class Members were provided  
2 with company-owned cell phones and vehicles to use during work hours. Defendant further asserted  
3 that individualized inquires regarding why a Class Member failed to receive reimbursement for certain  
4 expenses would predominate. (Minne Decl., ¶ 40.)

5 There are also substantial risks attached to Plaintiff’s claims for waiting time penalties and  
6 wage statement penalties. Such claims are derivative of Plaintiff’s primary claims for meal period, rest  
7 period, minimum wage and overtime violations. Thus, if certification is denied on the primary claims,  
8 these derivative claims would also likely fail. Moreover, even if Plaintiff prevails on the underlying  
9 claims, Plaintiff would still be required to show that Defendant’s conduct was willful in order to obtain  
10 Labor Code § 203 penalties, a difficult prospect. *See, e.g., Choate v. Celite Corp.*, 215 Cal App. 4th  
11 1460, 1468 (2013) (holding that “an employer’s reasonable, good faith belief that wages are not owed  
12 may negate a finding of willfulness”). Wage statement claims have also seen varying treatment at the  
13 appellate level because such claims have an element of discretion attached to them. *Cf., Jaimez v.*  
14 *DAIOHS USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal.App.4th 1286 (2010) *with Price v. Starbucks Corp.*, 192 Cal.App.4th  
15 1136 (2011). Accordingly, these derivative claims were extremely uncertain. (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 41-42.)

16 Plaintiff’s counsel also separately contemplated the numerous risks of proceeding with a  
17 PAGA claim. First, the same defenses and merits-based risks associated with Plaintiff’s direct Labor  
18 Code claims are also applicable to a PAGA claim. *See Green v. Lawrence Service Co.*, 2013 U.S. Dist.  
19 LEXIS 109270, at \*5, fn. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“whether each PAGA claims succeeds or fails is  
20 determined by the merits of the substantive claims on which each is based.”) Second, although  
21 California law is clear that PAGA actions need not satisfy class action requirements, there is currently  
22 a split in authority over whether PAGA claims may nevertheless be stricken based on manageability  
23 concerns. *Cf. Wesson v. Staples The Office Superstore*, 68 Cal.App.5th 746 (2021) *with Estrada v.*  
24 *Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc.*, 76 Cal.App.5th 685 (2022). Even if Plaintiff defeated any challenges to  
25 manageability, the Court could ultimately exercise its discretion to find that the imposition of  
26 heightened civil penalties was inappropriate, particularly if Plaintiff prevailed on his class claims. Cal.

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1 Lab. Code § 2699(2); *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1122 (2012).<sup>3</sup>  
2 (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 43-47.)

3 Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel recognized the significant risk and expense generally associated  
4 with continued litigation, trial, and possible appeals, all of which would substantially delay and reduce  
5 any recovery by the Class Members. Even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification, proving the  
6 amount of wages due to each Class Member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and extremely  
7 uncertain proposition. In order to prove liability and damages, Plaintiff’s counsel will need to request  
8 and analyze thousands of pages of documents, and obtain numerous declarations at great expense.  
9 Obtaining the cooperation of current employees would also be difficult, given the likely reluctance to  
10 aid prosecution of a lawsuit against a current employer. On the other hand, Defendant would likely be  
11 able to obtain the cooperation of its current employees. Moreover, even if Plaintiff successfully  
12 certifies the class on a contested motion and prevails on all claims at trial, possible appeals would  
13 substantially delay any recovery by the Class. These risks are all obviated by the Settlement, which if  
14 approved by the Court will ensure that class members receive timely relief without the risk of an  
15 unfavorable judgment. (Minne Decl., ¶ 49.)

16 Taking into account the specific strengths and weaknesses of each claim, and the unique risks  
17 associated therewith, Plaintiff’s counsel estimated that Defendant faced a risk-adjusted liability of  
18 \$1,474,608.54 for Plaintiff’s Class claims, and \$520,683.53 for Plaintiff’s PAGA claim. (Minne Decl.,  
19 ¶¶ 37-42, 48, 50.)

20 Therefore, after considering the strengths and weaknesses of each claim, and the unique risks  
21 associated therewith, the general risks of continue litigation, and the significant costs, expenses, and  
22 delay that would result from continued litigation, it is clear that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and  
23 adequate, and is in the best interest of the Class. (Minne Decl., ¶ 51; Hosseini Decl., ¶ 16.) Moreover,  
24 the Gross Settlement Amount of \$1,500,000.00 – which represents 24.8% of the maximum value of  
25 the direct Class claims at issue - falls within an acceptable range of recovery for this type of litigation  
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27 <sup>3</sup> See also, *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (reducing penalties by  
28 97.5%); *Fleming v. Covidien*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154590, \*8-9 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (reducing  
potential PAGA penalties by over 80 percent); *Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs. et al.*, 384 F. Supp. 3d  
1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2019)(applying 67% and 80% reductions to PAGA Penalties).

1 given the strengths and weaknesses of the case and the inherent costs and risks associated with class  
2 certification, representative adjudication, trial, and/or appeals. *See, e.g., Stovall-Gusman v. W.W.*  
3 *Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at \*12 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (approving settlement  
4 representing 10% of the maximum damages); *Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co.*, 306 F.R.D. 245,  
5 256 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (approving settlement representing approximately 8.5% of the maximum  
6 damages); *Avila v. Cold Spring Granite Co.*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130878 (E.D. Cal 2017)  
7 (approving settlement where gross recovery was 11% of the maximum damages). (Minne Decl., ¶ 51.)

8 **D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable.**

9 The \$50,000.00 allocated for penalties under PAGA is fair and reasonable. PAGA is  
10 fundamentally not intended to be compensatory in nature, but is instead intended to facilitate  
11 enforcement of California’s labor laws by financing state activities and educating and deterring non-  
12 compliance. *See* Cal. Labor Code § 2699(i); *Arias v. Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal. 4th 980; *Williams v. Sup. Ct.*, 3  
13 Cal.5th 531, 546 (2017); *Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC*, 59 Cal.4th 348, 379 (2014).  
14 Where, as here, the parties reach a substantial class-wide settlement providing employees with  
15 monetary compensation for underlying Labor Code violations, many of PAGA’s underlying policy  
16 objectives are satisfied. Indeed, the \$50,000.00 PAGA Payment is well-within the range approved by  
17 California courts. *See Nordstrom Comm. Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 589 (2010)(finding no abuse of  
18 trial court’s discretion in approval of release that included PAGA claims but allocated \$0 to PAGA  
19 penalties); *Alcala v. Meyer Logistics, Inc.*, 2019 WL 4452961, \*9 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2019) (settlement  
20 of claims for PAGA penalties representing 1.25% of gross settlement amount was reasonable, as it  
21 “falls within the zero to two percent range for PAGA claims approved by courts.”); *In re M.L. Stern*  
22 *Overtime Litig.*, 2009 WL 995864, \*1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009) (approving PAGA settlement of 2%);  
23 *Hopson v. Hanesbrands, Inc.*, 2008 WL 3385452, \*1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009) (approving PAGA  
24 settlement of 0.3%). (Minne Decl., ¶ 52.)

25 **V. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED.**

26 Code of Civil Procedure § 382 provides that three basic requirements must be met in order to  
27 sustain any class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class; (2) there must be a well-defined  
28 community of interest in the question of law or fact affecting the parties to be represented; and (3)

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1 certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e., proceeding as a class is  
2 superior to other methods. *Fireside Bank v. Superior Court*, 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1089 (2007); *see also*  
3 *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 326 (2004). Courts utilize a less stringent  
4 standard for class certification during settlement. *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*,  
5 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 859 (2003). The reason: “no trial is anticipated in a settlement class case, so the  
6 case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be confronted.” *Id.*

7 As demonstrated below, all three requirements for certification of the Class as defined by the  
8 Settlement are satisfied. Furthermore, Defendant has stipulated to certification of the proposed Class  
9 for settlement purposes only. (Agreement, ¶ 48.)

10 **A. There is an Ascertainable Class.**

11 Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size  
12 of the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. *See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal.App.3d  
13 862, 873 (1983). In this case, all three considerations strongly favor class certification. Here, the Class  
14 is defined as all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as hourly-paid and/or non-  
15 exempt who worked for Defendant at any time from May 5, 2018, to July 17, 2023. (Agreement, ¶¶ 6-7.)  
16 This provides a clear and definite scope for the proposed class.

17 Next, the class is sufficiently numerous. There is no magic number that satisfies the numerosity  
18 requirement. Under the Federal Rules, the minimum number of a class is 100 individuals. Under  
19 California law, that number is significantly less. *See e.g., Rose v. City of Haywood*, 126 Cal.App.3d  
20 926, 934 (1981) (holding 42 class members sufficient to satisfy numerosity); *Bowles v. Superior Court*,  
21 44 Cal.2d 574 (1955) (class with 10 members sufficiently numerous). Here, the estimated Class size  
22 of 396 individuals plainly favors class certification. (Minne Decl., ¶ 15.)

23 Finally, the question whether class members are easily identifiable turns on whether a plaintiff  
24 can establish “the existence of an ascertainable class.” *Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.*, 67 Cal. 2d 695, 706  
25 (1967). The existence of an ascertainable class in this case can be established through Defendant’s  
26 payroll records, and the class definition is sufficiently specific to enable the parties, potential Class  
27 Members and the Court to determine the parameters of the Class.

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1           **B. The Class Shares a Well-Defined Community of Interest.**

2           The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of  
3 law and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class  
4 representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806. This case  
5 satisfies all three requirements.

6                   1. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate.

7           The commonality criterion requires the existence of common question of law or fact and is  
8 generally established with the issues of predominance and typicality. *See Daar*, 67 Cal.2d 695, 706.  
9 What is required is that a common question of fact or law exist which predominates over issues unique  
10 to individual plaintiffs. The existence of individual issues or facts—generally present in any case  
11 arising from employment—is not a bar to class certification as long as they do not render class  
12 litigation unmanageable or predominate over the common issues. *See B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v.*  
13 *Owens-Illinois, Inc.*, 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1354 (1987).

14           Here, Plaintiff’s claims present sufficient common issues of law and fact that predominate and  
15 warrant class certification. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant required employees to take on-duty meal  
16 and rest periods, and utilized rounding practices that failed to compensate Class Members for all time  
17 actually worked. These policies and practices meant that Defendant failed to pay required meal period  
18 premiums, minimum wages, and overtime wages, and other related claims. Plaintiff alleges that  
19 Defendant’s policies and practices were uniform as to all Class Members. Thus, class treatment is  
20 appropriate.

21                   2. Plaintiff’s Claims are Typical of the Class.

22           To satisfy the typicality requirement, California law does not require that Plaintiff has claims  
23 identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class representative is whether  
24 other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not  
25 unique to the named plaintiff, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course  
26 of conduct. *See Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 (2007). The typicality  
27 requirement for a class representative refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the representative,  
28 and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. *See Id.*

1 Here, Plaintiff alleges that his claims are based on the same legal theories, arise out of the same  
2 unlawful policies and practices, and seek the same relief. Because Plaintiff’s claims are based on the  
3 same alleged conduct and business practices as the claims of the other Class Members, the typicality  
4 requirement is satisfied.

5 3. Plaintiff and His Counsel Will Fairly and Adequately Represent the Class.

6 The question of adequacy of representation “depends on whether the plaintiff’s attorney  
7 qualifies to conduct the proposed litigation in the plaintiff’s interest or not antagonistic to the interests  
8 of the class.” *McGee v. Bank of America*, 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450 (1976). Here, these considerations  
9 are satisfied. Class Counsel are well-regarded and accomplished lawyers who are qualified and  
10 experienced in employment-related, class-action litigation, and who do not have any conflicts of  
11 interest which would impede their representation of the Class. (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 55-62; Hosseini Decl.,  
12 ¶¶ 2-7.) Furthermore, because Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of other Class Members, and are  
13 not based on unique circumstances that might jeopardize the claims of the class, there is no antagonism  
14 of interests between Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff is also fully aware of their duties as the class  
15 representative, and will vigorously and adequately represent the interests of the Class. (Zaragoza Decl.,  
16 ¶¶ 4-10.) Therefore, the adequacy requirement is satisfied.

17 **C. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.**

18 Under the circumstances, proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this  
19 dispute, as the Class Members and the court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would  
20 serve as the only means to deter and redress the alleged violations. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23  
21 Cal.4th 429, 434 (2000) (relevant considerations include the probability that each class member will  
22 come forward to prove her or her separate claim and whether the class approach would actually serve  
23 to deter and redress the alleged wrongdoing). Further, individual actions arising out of the same  
24 operative facts would unduly burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results. Therefore, class  
25 action proceedings are superior to individual litigation.

26 **VI. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE.**

27 Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value of attorneys’ fees and their decisions  
28 will “not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” *Lealao v. Beneficial Cal, Inc.*,



1 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000). California law provides that attorney fee awards should be equivalent  
2 to fees paid in the legal marketplace to compensate for the result achieved and risk incurred. *Id.* at 47.  
3 In cases where class members present claims against a common fund and the defendant agrees a  
4 percentage of the fund as part of the settlement, use of the percentage method is appropriate. *Id.* at 32.

5 Historically, courts have awarded fees as high as fifty percent (50%) of the settlement,  
6 depending on the circumstances of the case. *Newberg on Class Actions*, § 14.03 (4<sup>th</sup> Ed.); *see also In*  
7 *re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.*, 526 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1981) (awarding attorneys’ fees in the amount  
8 of 45% of the \$7.3 million settlement); *Beech Cinema, Inc. v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.*  
9 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 480 F.Supp. 1195 (awarding approximately 53% of the settlement as attorneys’ fees).  
10 California courts routinely approve class action attorneys’ fee awards averaging around one-third of  
11 the recovery. *In re Consumer Privacy Cases*, 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 558 at n.13 (2009); *Chavez v.*  
12 *Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 n.11 (lower court found 20 to 40 percent range of  
13 contingency fee in marketplace was appropriate in class actions.)

14 Here, the requested attorneys’ fees of \$525,000.00 which is 35% of the common fund, is  
15 disclosed to Class Members in the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement. (Agreement, Exh. A.)  
16 The requested fee was freely negotiated, is common in the legal marketplace, and is not opposed by  
17 Defendant. The Motion for Final Approval will elaborate on the nature of the legal services provided  
18 and will also support Class Counsel’s request for the reimbursement of litigation costs not to exceed  
19 \$30,000.00. (Minne Decl., ¶ 54.)

20 **VII. THE PROPOSED ENHANCEMENT AWARD IS REASONABLE.**

21 Plaintiffs in class action lawsuits are eligible for reasonable incentive payments as  
22 compensation “for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of  
23 the class.” *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412 (2010). Courts routinely  
24 grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class  
25 representative, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class and are appropriate  
26 given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. *See Van Vranken v. Atlantic*  
27 *Richfield Co.*, 901 F.Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (approving \$50,000.00 enhancement); *In re*  
28 *Online DVD Rental*, 779 F.3d 934, 947-948 (9th Cir. 2014) (approving incentive award 417 times

1 larger than individual payments where incentive award made up a mere .17% of the settlement);  
2 *Gaudin v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc.*, 2015 WL 7454183, at \*10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (finding  
3 service award of \$15,000 to be “fair and reasonable”); *Miller v. CEVA Logistics USA, Inc.*, 2015 WL  
4 4730176, at \* 9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2015)(approving service award of \$15,000 to each plaintiff); *Glass*  
5 *v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.*, 2007 WL 221862 at \*16 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving payments of \$25,000  
6 to each named plaintiff); *In re Heritage Bond Litigation*, 2005 WL 1594403 at \*18 (C.D. Cal. 2005)  
7 (awarding incentive payments between \$5,000 and \$18,000).

8 Plaintiff initiated this litigation on behalf of his former co-workers who can now collect  
9 monetary payment from the Settlement. Plaintiff invested substantial time and effort into litigation  
10 including their own research, reviewing documents, and extensive discussions with Class Counsel.  
11 (Zaragoza Decl., ¶¶ 4-8.) Further, the requested Enhancement Award is extremely reasonable given  
12 the benefit gained by other Class Members. The requested Enhancement Award of \$10,000.00 to  
13 Plaintiff is disclosed to Class Members in the Class Notice. (Agreement, Exh. A.) For these reasons,  
14 Plaintiff requests that an Enhancement Award of \$10,000.00 be preliminarily approved by the Court.  
15 (Minne Decl., ¶ 53; Hosseini Decl., ¶ 14; Zaragoza Decl., ¶ 11.)

16 **VIII. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE, AND OPT-OUT AND OBJECTION**  
17 **PROCEDURES SATISFY DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS**

18 “The principal purpose of notice to the class is the protection of the integrity of the class action  
19 process.” *Cartt v. Superior Court* , 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 970 (1975). The notice ““must fairly apprise  
20 the class members of the terms of the proposed compromise and of the options open to the  
21 dissenting class members.”” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 251 (2001).  
22 Additionally, the notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage  
23 of the class members. *Cartt*, 50 Cal.App.3d at 974.

24 The Parties have selected Phoenix Class Action Settlement Administration Solutions to  
25 administer the Settlement. (Minne Decl., ¶ 26; Agreement ¶ 36.)<sup>4</sup> Phoenix Class Action Settlement  
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27 <sup>4</sup> Plaintiff’s counsel also obtained administration estimates from ILYM Group, Inc., Rust Consulting, and Simpluris, Inc.  
28 Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions was ultimately selected as the Settlement Administrator because it  
provided the lowest estimate and, consequently, would result in the highest net recovery by Participating Class Members.  
(Minne Decl., ¶ 26, Exh. 2-5.)

1 Administration Solutions has extensive experience in administering class action and PAGA  
2 settlements, and has procedures in place to protect the security of class data as well as adequate  
3 insurance for errors and omissions. (Declaration of Jodey Lawrence [“Lawrence Decl.”], ¶¶ 3-11, Exh.  
4 A.) The Parties and their counsel do not have any financial interest in Phoenix Class Action Settlement  
5 Administration Solutions that would create a conflict of interest. (Minne Decl., ¶ 61; Lawrence Decl.,  
6 ¶ 4.)

7 The Parties have jointly drafted a Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”) which  
8 will be sent to Class Members in both in both English and Spanish. (Agreement, ¶¶ 19, 67, Exh. A).  
9 The Class Notice describes the nature of the lawsuit, the key terms of the Settlement, the scope of the  
10 Released Class Claims and Released PAGA Claims, Class Members’ estimated Individual Settlement  
11 Payment and Individual PAGA Payment, Class Members’ total workweeks during the Class Period,  
12 and PAGA Member’s total workweeks during the PAGA Period. (Agreement, Exh. A.) The Class  
13 Notice also informs Class Members how to opt-out of the Settlement, object to the Settlement, and  
14 challenge their reported workweeks. (*Id.*) The Class Notice will indicate that the Court has determined  
15 only that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the proposed settlement might be fair, adequate  
16 and reasonable, and a final determination of such issues will be made at the final hearing. (*Id.*) The  
17 Class Notice also include instructions on how to obtain all relevant Settlement documents (including  
18 the contact information for Class counsel, a URL to a website maintained by the Administrator  
19 containing the key documents related to the Settlement, and a URL to the Court’s website for  
20 scheduling appointments to obtain the Settlement directly from the Clerk’s office), and informs Class  
21 Members of their right to attend the final approval hearing. (*Id.*).

22 No later than 21 calendar days after the Court grants Preliminary Approval of the Settlement,  
23 Defendant shall provide the Administrator with the Class List containing all Class Members’ names,  
24 last-known mailing addresses, Social Security numbers, and start and end dates of active employment  
25 with Defendant. (*Id.*, ¶ 64.) No later than 7 calendar days after receiving the Class List from Defendant,  
26 the Administrator shall mail copies of the Class Notice to all Class Members via regular First Class  
27 U.S. Mail. (*Id.*, ¶ 65.) Before mailing the Class Notice to Class Members, the Administrator shall  
28 perform a search based on the National Change of Address Database to update and correct any known

1 or identifiable address changes. (*Id.*, ¶ 66.)

2 If any Class Notice as undeliverable, the Administer shall promptly re-mail such returned Class  
3 Notices to the forwarding address provided by the USPS. (*Id.*) If no forwarding address is provided,  
4 the Administrator shall search for a current address using all readily available resources, such as skip  
5 tracing, and re-mail the Class Notice to the most current address obtained. (*Id.*) The Administrator has  
6 no obligation to make further attempts to locate or send Class Notice to Class Members whose Class  
7 Notice is returned by the USPS a second time. (*Id.*) Class Members shall have 60 days after the  
8 mailing of the Class Notice to submit request for exclusions, objection, or workweek dispute by fax,  
9 email, or mail. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 34, 68, 69, 73.) Further, the Response Deadline shall be extended by 15 calendar  
10 days for all Class Members whose Class Notices are re-mailed. (*Id.*, ¶ 66.)

11 Direct mail notice to Class Members' last known addresses is the best possible notice under  
12 the circumstances. *See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950); *Eisen*  
13 *v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 173-176 (1974). Furthermore, the Class Notice comports with  
14 the requirements of California Rules of Court, Rules 3.769 and 3.766. Pursuant to Rule 3.769(f), the  
15 class notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for class members  
16 to follow in filing written objections to it and arranging to appear at the hearing and state objections to  
17 the proposed settlement. Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(f). Rule 3.766 further requires that the class notice include  
18 (1) a brief explanation of the case, including the basic contentions and denials of the parties; (2) a  
19 procedure for the class member to follow in requesting exclusion, and a statement that the Court will  
20 exclude the Class Member from the Class if he or she so requests by the specified deadline; (3) a  
21 statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will bind all class members who do not request  
22 exclusion; (4) a statement that any Class Member who does not request exclusion may, if the class  
23 member so desires, object and enter an appearance through counsel. The proposed Class Notice satisfies  
24 each of these requirements. *See Agreement, Exh. A.*

25 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court appoint Phoenix Class Action  
26 Administration Solutions as the Settlement Administrator and direct the mailing of the Class Notice  
27 to the Class Members in the manner outlined and based on the proposed deadlines set forth in the  
28 Agreement.

1 **IX. CONCLUSION**

2 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court: (1) grant  
3 Preliminary Approval of the Settlement; (2) approve the Class Notice and plan for distribution of the  
4 Class Notice; (3) provisionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only; and (4) schedule a  
5 hearing on Final Approval of the Settlement.

6 Respectfully submitted,

7 Dated: July 17, 2023

**PARKER & MINNE, LLP**

8  
9 By: \_\_\_\_\_



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