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15 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
16 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

17
18 ARTURO GONZALEZ, individually, and on
19 behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated,

20 Plaintiff,

21 vs.

22 HUNT ENTERPRISES, INC., a California
23 corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

24 Defendants.

Case No.: 22STCV15057

*Assigned for all purposes to the Honorable
Lawrence P. Riff, Dept. 7*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT THEREOF**

Date: June 12, 2023
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Dept.: 7

Complaint Filed: May 5, 2022
Trial Date: Not Set

Electronically FILED by
Superior Court of California,
County of Los Angeles
5/16/2023 9:10 PM
David W. Slayton,
Executive Officer/Clerk of Court,
By G. Carini, Deputy Clerk

1 **TO THE HONORABLE COURT, AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS**
2 **OF RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on June 12, 2023 at 10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as may
4 be heard in Department 7 of the above-entitled court, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles,
5 California 90012, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769,
6 Plaintiff Arturo Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move the Court for entry of an order
7 granting preliminary approval of the proposed Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement entered
8 between Plaintiff and Defendant Hunt Enterprises, Inc. (“Defendant”). Specifically, Plaintiff requests
9 that the Court enter an order:

10 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
11 and Joint Stipulation to Amend Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement attached as Exhibit 1
12 and Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of S. Emi Minne in support of Motion for Preliminary Approval
13 (collectively, “Agreement” or “Settlement”);

14 2. Approving the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final
15 Court Approval (“Class Notice”) attached as Exhibit A to the Agreement, and the proposed deadlines
16 for the settlement administration process;

17 3. Approving the opt-out and objection procedures set forth in the Agreement and Class
18 Notice;

19 4. Provisionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes;

20 5. Appointing Plaintiff as the Class Representative for the Class for settlement purposes;

21 6. Appointing S. Emi Minne and Jill J. Parker of Parker & Minne, LLP and Edwin
22 Aiwazian, Arby Aiwazian, Joanna Ghosh, and Elizabeth Parker-Fawley of Lawyers for Justice, PC as
23 Class Counsel for settlement purposes;

24 7. Appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Settlement Administrator;

25 8. Directing Defendant to furnish the names, last known mailing address, social security
26 numbers, and number of Class Period Workweeks and PAGA Pay Periods for all Class Members, to
27 the to the Administrator no later than 30 days after the Court grants preliminary approval of the
28 Settlement, as well as any other information the Administrator may reasonably require to administer

1 the Settlement;

2 9. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

3 Good cause exists for the granting of this motion as the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate,
4 and reasonable. Additionally, the proposed notice process complies with California Rules of Court,
5 Rules 3.766 and 3.769, and mailing the proposed Class Notice to the Class Members' last known
6 addresses is an appropriate form of giving notice.

7 Pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699(1)(2), a copy of the proposed Settlement, as well as
8 information regarding the preliminary approval hearing on this matter, were submitted to the
9 California Labor Workforce Development Agency via online filing at <https://www.dir.ca.gov/Private-Attorneys-General-Act/Private-Attorneys-General-Act.html> on May 16, 2023. *See* Minne Decl. ¶ 75,
10 Exh. 6.
11

12 The motion is based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities; the
13 Declaration of S. Emi Minne and exhibits thereto; the Declaration of Joanna Ghosh; the Declaration
14 of Arturo Gonzalez; the Declaration of Ralph Moore on behalf of Defendant Hunt Enterprises; the
15 Declaration of Nancy Rader Whitehead; the Declaration of Jodey Lawrence on behalf of Phoenix
16 Settlement Administrators; the pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this matter; and
17 any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.
18

19 Respectfully submitted,

20 Dated: May 16, 2023

PARKER & MINNE, LLP


21 By: 
22 _____
23 S. Emi Minne
24 Attorneys for Plaintiff
25 ARTURO GONZALEZ
26
27
28

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 This is a putative wage and hour class action brought by Plaintiff Arturo Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”)
4 against Defendant Hunt Enterprises, Inc. (“Defendant”) on behalf of Defendant’s current and former non-
5 exempt employees. By way of this Motion, Plaintiff seeks preliminary approval of a non-reversionary Class
6 Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement” or “Agreement”)¹, which will resolve the Action in
7 its entirety. The key terms of the Agreement are as follows:

- 8 • Size of the Class: approximately 255 individuals.
- 9 • Gross Settlement Amount: \$775,564.00, exclusive of employer payroll taxes.
- 10 • Settlement Administration Costs: \$8,500.00.
- 11 • Requested Class Representative Service Payment: \$7,500.00.
- 12 • Requested Attorney’s Fees and Costs: \$271,517.40, plus costs not to exceed \$30,000.00.
- 13 • PAGA Penalties: \$50,000.00, 75% of which will be paid to the LWDA, with the remaining 25% paid
14 to Aggrieved Employees.
- 15 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: \$408,046.00.
- 16 • Average Estimated Individual Class Payment: \$1,600.18.
- 17 • Average Estimated Individual PAGA Payment: \$62.50.

18 As set forth herein, the Agreement is the product of informed discovery, arms-length
19 negotiations by experienced counsel, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the
20 Class. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that the Court enter an order granting preliminary
21 approval of the proposed Settlement.

22 **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

23 Defendant is a real estate investment company that manages residential, industrial, and
24 commercial properties throughout Southern California. (Declaration of S. Emi Minne [“Minne
25

26 _____
27 ¹ The Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Joint Stipulation to Amend Class Action and PAGA Settlement
28 Agreement are attached as Exhibits 1-2 to the Declaration of S. Emi Minne in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Minne Decl.”). The Agreement and Class Notice are based on this Court’s model
Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement. A redlined version showing all modifications made to the model
agreement is also being submitted for the Court’s review. *See* Minne Decl., Exh. 3.

1 Decl.”], ¶ 3.) Plaintiff is a former non-exempt employee of Defendant who worked as a plumber from
2 approximately March 3, 2003, to January 28, 2020. (Minne Decl., ¶ 4; Declaration of Arturo Gonzalez
3 [“Gonzalez Decl.”], ¶ 3.)

4 On May 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint against Defendant entitled
5 *Arturo Gonzalez v. Hunt Enterprises, Inc.* (Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No.
6 22STCV15057, hereinafter “Action”). The original Complaint alleged the following causes of action:
7 (1) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 (Unpaid Overtime Wages); (2) Violation of
8 California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512(a) (Unpaid Meal Period Premiums); (3) Violation of
9 California Labor Code § 226.7 (Unpaid Rest Period Premiums); (4) Violation of California Labor
10 Code §§ 1194, 1197, and 1197.1 (Unpaid Minimum Wages); (5) Violation of California Labor Code
11 §§ 201 and 202 (Final Wages Not Timely Paid); (6) Violation of California Labor Code § 204 (Wages
12 Not Timely Paid During Employment); (7) Violation of California Labor Code § 226(a) (Non-
13 Compliant Wage Statements); (8) Violation of California Labor Code § 1174(d) (Failure to Keep
14 Requisite Payroll Records); (9) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 (Unreimbursed
15 Business Expenses); and (10) Violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.
16 (Minne Decl., ¶ 5.)

17 On August 29, 2022, the Court held an initial status conference, at which time the Court lifted
18 the discovery stay as to issues related to class certification. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.) On August 30, 2022, Plaintiff
19 served his first set of formal written discovery requests on Defendant, which consisted of Special
20 Interrogatories, Form Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents. (*Id.*, ¶ 7.) Plaintiff
21 also noticed the deposition of Defendant’s person most knowledgeable. (*Id.*)

22 Shortly after Plaintiff served his first set of written discovery requests, Plaintiff’s counsel met
23 and conferred with Defendant’s counsel regarding the potential for early resolution of the Action. (*Id.*,
24 ¶ 8.) Pursuant to these discussions, the Parties agreed to stay formal discovery, exchange informal
25 discovery, and engage in private mediation. (*Id.*) As a further pre-condition for early mediation,
26 Defendant further formally stipulated that: (1) the Parties would finalize the substantive format of a
27 *Belaire-West* notice prior to mediation, which would be promptly sent if mediation was unsuccessful;
28 and (2) that it would not engage in a mass release campaign prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

1 Pursuant to the Parties' agreement, Defendant provided Plaintiff's counsel with extensive
2 informal discovery prior to mediation, which included a 20% sampling of Class Members' time and
3 payroll records. The sampling was randomly selected and included employees across the Class Period.
4 (*Id.*, ¶ 9.) Defendant also provided Plaintiff's counsel with all versions of Defendant's employee
5 handbooks in use during the Class Period and other documents evidencing its relevant wage and hour
6 policies and procedures, as well as exemplars of arbitration agreements signed by Class Members.
7 (*Id.*) Finally, Defendant provided Plaintiff's counsel with key data points regarding the size and
8 composition of the Class, such as the number of Class Members and Aggrieved Employees (including
9 the number of current versus former employees), the number of Class Members who had signed
10 arbitration agreements, the total number of workweek and pay periods worked by Class Members, the
11 number of pay periods worked by Aggrieved Employees, and the average rates of pay for the Class.
12 (*Id.*)

13 Prior to mediation, Plaintiff's Counsel thoroughly reviewed the informal discovery produced
14 by Defendant, which included consulting with an expert to analyze Class Members' time and payroll
15 records. (*Id.*, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff's counsel also engaged in further independent investigation and research
16 regarding the merits of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's potential defenses thereto. (*Id.*) Based on
17 this investigation and informal discovery, Plaintiff's counsel prepared a detailed and informed
18 assessment of Defendant's potential liability in advance of mediation. (*Id.*) Plaintiff's counsel also
19 extensively briefed the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's anticipated
20 defenses, and provided their analysis to the mediator for her consideration. (*Id.*)

21 After completing a thorough investigation and analysis of Plaintiff's claims, on March 6, 2023,
22 the Parties attended a formal mediation with Phyllis Cheng, Esq., a neutral and respected mediator
23 with extensive experience in complex wage and hour matters. (*Id.*, ¶ 11.) The Parties engaged in a full
24 day of settlement discussions, during which the Parties debated their respective positions and
25 exchanged views regarding the strengths and weaknesses of their claims and defenses. (*Id.*) The
26 settlement discussions were at all times at arm's length and, although conducted with appropriate
27 professional decorum, were adversarial. (*Id.*) Plaintiff and his counsel went into mediation willing to
28 explore the potential for a settlement of the Action, but were also prepared to litigate Plaintiff's claims

1 through class certification, trial, and appeal if a settlement was not reached. (*Id.*) Following a full day
2 of negotiations, the mediation culminated in the issuance of a mediator’s proposal, which was accepted
3 by the Parties. (*Id.*, ¶ 12.) A memorandum of understanding memorializing the key terms of the
4 agreement was executed on March 7, 2023. (*Id.*)

5 On March 13, 2023, Plaintiff provided written notice to the LWDA and Defendant of his intent
6 to seek civil penalties under Labor Code section 2698, et seq. (“PAGA”). (*Id.*, ¶ 13.) The Parties also
7 entered into a Joint Stipulation to allow Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) adding a
8 PAGA claim, which is concurrently filed herewith.

9 On or about May 2, 2023, after extensive further negotiations, the Parties fully executed a long
10 form Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 14, Exh. 1.) On or about May 9, 2023,
11 the Parties executed a Stipulation to Amend the Class Action and PAGA Agreement to address a minor
12 typographical error regarding the tax treatment of Individual Class Payments. (*Id.*, ¶ 15 Exh. 2.) The
13 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and amendment thereto are collectively referred to
14 herein as the “Agreement” or “Settlement”. The Agreement was based off the Los Angeles County
15 Superior Court’s model Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 16, Exh. 3.)

16 **III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

17 **A. Definition of the Proposed Settlement Class and Aggrieved Employees.**

18 For purposes of Settlement only, the Parties have agreed to certify the following class: “All
19 persons employed by Defendant Hunt Enterprises, Inc. in California and classified as a hourly-paid
20 and/or non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant Hunt Enterprises, Inc. during the Class
21 Period.” (Minne Decl., ¶ 18; Agreement, ¶ 1.5.) The Class Period runs from May 5, 2018 to May 5,
22 2023. (Minne Decl., ¶ 18; Agreement, ¶ 1.12.) There are approximately 255 Class Members. (Minne
23 Decl., ¶ 19; Agreement, ¶ 4.1.)

24 The Settlement also includes a subgroup of “Aggrieved Employees” which consist of those
25 individuals who worked for Defendant as hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees during the PAGA
26 Period. (Minne Decl., ¶ 20; Agreement, ¶ 1.4.) The PAGA Period runs from May 5, 2021 to May 5,
27 2023. (Minne Decl., ¶ 20; Agreement, ¶ 1.31.) There are approximately 200 Aggrieved Employees.
28 (Minne Decl., ¶ 21; Agreement, ¶ 4.1.)

1 **B. Gross Settlement Amount**

2 The Parties have agreed to settle the Class and PAGA claims at issue in the Proposed FAC for
3 Gross Settlement Amount of \$775,564.00. (Minne Decl., ¶ 22; Agreement, ¶¶ 1.22, 3.1.) The Gross
4 Settlement Amount is non-reversionary, and does not include employer-side payroll taxes, which shall
5 be separately paid by Defendant. (Minne Decl., ¶ 22; Agreement, ¶ 3.1.) The Gross Settlement Amount
6 shall be allocated as follows:

- 7 • Class Representative Service Payment of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff. (Minne Decl., ¶ 23;
8 Agreement, ¶¶ 1.14, 3.2.1.)
- 9 • Attorneys’ Fees to Class Counsel in the amount of 35% of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e.,
10 \$271,517.40). (Minne Decl., ¶ 23; Agreement, ¶¶ 1.7, 3.2.2.)
- 11 • Reimbursement of Class Counsel’s actual litigation costs and expenses, not to exceed
12 \$30,000.00. (Minne Decl., ¶ 23; Agreement, ¶¶ 1.7, 3.2.2.)
- 13 • Settlement Administration Expenses not to exceed \$8,500.00. (Minne Decl., ¶ 23; Agreement,
14 ¶¶ 1.3, 3.2.3.)
- 15 • PAGA Penalties in the amount of \$50,000.00, 75% of which shall be allocated to the LWDA,
16 and 25% of which shall be distributed to Aggrieved Employees. (Minne Decl., ¶ 23;
17 Agreement, ¶¶ 1.24, 1.27, 1.34, 3.2.5.)

18 The Gross Settlement Amount, less the payments listed above, shall be the “Net Settlement
19 Amount”, which shall be distributed to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments on
20 a pro rata basis according to the number of workweeks worked during the Class Period. (Minne Decl.,
21 ¶¶ 24-25; Agreement, ¶¶ 1.23, 1.28, 3.2.4.) Individual Class Payments shall be allocated as 15% as
22 wages subject to all applicable tax withholdings, and 85% as non-wage payments not subject to tax
23 withholdings. (Minne Decl., ¶ 27; Agreement, ¶ 3.2.4.1; Amendment to Agreement, ¶ 1.) The Net
24 Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be approximately \$408,046.60. (Minne Decl., ¶ 24.) It is
25 currently estimated that Class Members will receive an average Individual Class Payment of
26 \$1,600.18. (Minne Decl., ¶ 25.)

27 In addition to the Individual Class Payments from the Net Settlement Amount, Aggrieved
28 Employees shall receive a pro-rata share of the 25% portion of PAGA Penalties allocated for
distribution to Aggrieved Employees. (Minne Decl., ¶ 28; Agreement, ¶ 3.2.5.) Individual PAGA
Payments will be distributed on a pro-rata basis based on the number of pay periods worked by

1 Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period. (Minne Decl., ¶ 28; Agreement, ¶ 3.2.5.1.) The
2 estimated average Individual PAGA Payment to Aggrieved Employees is \$62.50. (Minne Decl., ¶ 28.)

3 The Settlement Administrator shall determine the eligibility for, and the amounts of, each
4 Individual Settlement Award under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 4.4, 7.4-7.8.) All
5 payments owed under the Settlement shall be disbursed within 44 days of the Effective Date. (Minne
6 Decl., ¶ 29; Agreement, ¶¶ 4.3, 4.4.) If an Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA
7 Payment check remains uncashed after one hundred eighty (180) days from the initial mailing, the
8 Settlement Administrator shall transfer the value of the uncashed checks to the California Controller’s
9 Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Participating Class Member or Aggrieved Employee.
10 (Minne Decl., ¶ 29, Agreement ¶¶ 4.4.1, 4.4.3.) As such, no “unpaid residue” under California Code
11 of Civil Procedure § 384 will result from the Settlement. (Minne Decl., ¶ 29.)

12 **C. Release of Class and PAGA Claims.**

13 Upon the funding of the Gross Settlement Amount and all employer payroll taxes, Plaintiff,
14 Participating Class Members, and Aggrieved Employees shall be deemed to have released their
15 respective Released Claims against the Released Parties. (Agreement ¶¶ 5, 5.2-5.4.) The scope of the
16 release is narrowly tailored to release claims based on facts alleged in the FAC, depending on whether
17 Class Members elect to opt-out of the settlement and whether such individuals qualify as Aggrieved
18 Employees. (*Id.*) All Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees will release PAGA claims even
19 if they request exclusion from the Class. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 5.3, 5.4, 7.5.4.) In addition to the release of claims
20 made by all Participating Class Members and Aggrieved Employees, as set forth above, Plaintiff, in
21 his individual capacity, agrees to a general release of all claims against Defendant. (*Id.*, ¶ 5.1.)

22 The Parties and their counsel are unaware of any other pending matters or actions that assert
23 claims that will be extinguished to adversely affected by the Settlement. (*Id.*, ¶ 74; Declaration of
24 Joanna Ghosh [“Ghosh Decl.”], ¶ 16; Declaration of Ralph Moore [“Moore Decl.”], ¶ 3; Declaration
25 of Nancy Rader Whitehead [“Whitehead Decl.”], ¶ 3.)

26 **D. Confidentiality Prior to Preliminary Approval**

27 The Settlement provides that the terms of the Settlement are to remain confidential until
28 preliminary approval is granted. (*Id.*, ¶ 12.2.) However, the confidentiality provisions do not restrict

1 Plaintiff’s counsel’s communications with Class Members in accordance with their ethical obligations
2 to the Class. (*Id.*)

3 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL.**

4 **A. Standard of Review for Preliminary Approval**

5 The review and approval of a proposed class action settlement involves a two-step process. *See*
6 Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c). First, counsel submit the proposed terms of settlement and the
7 Court makes a preliminary assessment of whether the settlement appears to be sufficiently within the
8 range of a fair settlement to justify providing notice of the proposed settlement to class members.
9 Second, after notice is provided to the class, the Court must conduct a second inquiry into whether the
10 proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. *Id.*

11 The initial evaluation of a settlement at preliminary approval “is not a fairness hearing.”
12 *Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of City of Milwaukee*, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled
13 on other grounds by *Felzen v. Andreas*, 134 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998). Rather, the limited purpose
14 of this initial inquiry is to determine, at a threshold level, whether the proposed settlement is within
15 the range of possible approval and, as a result, “whether there is any reason to notify the class members
16 of the proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing.” *Id.* As set forth below, the
17 Settlement is within the range of possible approval. Accordingly, preliminary approval should be
18 granted.

19 **B. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness.**

20 California Courts recognize that a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is
21 reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow
22 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the
23 percentage of objectors is small. *In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal.App.4th 706, 723 (2006); *7-Eleven*
24 *Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146 (2000). Because the
25 proposed Settlement was reached through arm’s-length negotiations based on sufficient investigation
26 and discovery by qualified counsel, it is entitled to a presumption of fairness.²

27 _____
28 ² At preliminary approval, the fourth factor – the percentage of objectors – is not applicable, as notice has not yet been provided to the Class and Class Members have not yet had an opportunity to object to the Settlement.

1 1. The Proposed Settlement Was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining.

2 The Settlement was reached following a full day of mediation with Phyllis Cheng, Esq., a
3 highly respected mediator. (Minne Decl., ¶ 11.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and,
4 although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into settlement
5 discussions willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also
6 prepared to litigate its position through class certification, trial, and appeal if a settlement was not
7 reached. (Minne Decl., ¶ 11.) The Settlement was ultimately reached pursuant to a mediator’s proposal
8 which was accepted by the Parties. (*Id.*, ¶ 12.) The proposed Settlement was reached at the end of a
9 process that was neither fraudulent nor collusive. (*Id.*, ¶ 17.) To the contrary, counsel for the Parties
10 advanced their respective positions throughout the settlement negotiations. (*Id.*; see also Ghosh Decl,
11 ¶ 13.)

12 2. Plaintiff and His Counsel Conducted Sufficient Investigation and Discovery to
13 Allow the Court and the Parties Act Intelligently.

14 Courts typically assess the status of discovery in determining whether a proposed class action
15 settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801
16 (1996). As detailed above, prior to reaching the Settlement, Plaintiff and his counsel propounded
17 formal discovery, and obtained extensive informal discovery which included: a representative 20%
18 sampling of Class Members’ time and payroll documents; all versions of Defendant’s employee
19 handbooks in use during the Class Period and other documents reflecting Defendant’s applicable wage
20 and hour policies; exemplars of arbitration agreements purportedly signed by Class Members; and
21 data points regarding the size and composition of the putative class, total workweeks and pay periods
22 worked by Class Members and Aggrieved Employees, and the average rate of pay for the Class.
23 (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff’s counsel thoroughly reviewed this informal discovery prior to
24 mediation, which included consulting with an expert to fully analyze Class Members’ time and payroll
25 records. (*Id.*, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff’s counsel also conducted further independent investigation and research
26 regarding Plaintiff’s claims. (*Id.*) Based on this investigation, Plaintiff’s counsel prepared a detailed
27 assessment of Defendant’s potential liability, and extensively briefed the strengths and weaknesses of
28 Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s anticipated defenses prior to mediation. Thus, Plaintiff’s counsel

1 were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*; see also
2 Ghosh Decl., ¶ 10-12)

3 3. Plaintiff's Counsel is Experienced in Class Action Litigation.

4 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
5 Plaintiff's counsel are respected members of the bar with strong records of effective advocacy for their
6 clients, and are experienced in handling complex wage-and-hour class action litigation. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 66-71;
7 Ghosh Decl., ¶¶ 2-7.) Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims in this
8 action, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the Class Members. (*Id.*,
9 ¶¶ 61-62; Ghosh Decl., ¶ 17; Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 8.)

10 **C. The Settlement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' Respective**
11 **Positions and Risks of Continued Litigation**

12 A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at
13 trial, nor does the settlement have to obtain 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
14 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 (2001). In evaluating the
15 reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court must consider "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk,
16 expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status
17 through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the
18 proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the
19 reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168
20 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008).

21 Plaintiff's counsel has carefully considered Plaintiff's claims and analyzed class-wide
22 violation rates. Based on information gathered by Plaintiff's counsel, including calculations of
23 Defendant's maximum potential liability exposure and the risks associated with continued litigation,
24 Plaintiff's counsel has determined that the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.
25 (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 31-62.)

26 a. Defendant's Maximum Potential Exposure.

27 Based on information gathered through discovery, Plaintiff's counsel estimated that if all class
28 claims were adjudicated in favor of the Class, Defendant's maximum potential liability for the Class

1 claims is \$4,204,888.66. (*Id.*, ¶ 31.) This estimate can be broken down by claim as follows:
2 \$727,391.17 in unpaid overtime and minimum wages; \$1,137,071.25 in unpaid meal period premiums;
3 \$1,045,102.25 in unpaid rest period premiums; \$127,500.00 in unreimbursed business expenses;
4 \$367,824.00 in waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203; and \$800,000.00 in wage statement
5 penalties under Labor Code § 226. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 32-37.)

6 In addition to the damages for the Class claims, Plaintiff's counsel also separately calculated
7 Defendant's potential liability for civil penalties under PAGA to be \$4,216,317.00, which can be
8 broken down by violation as follows: \$367,275.00 for overtime violations; \$734,550.00 for minimum
9 wage violations; \$639,058.50 for meal period violations; \$639,058.50 for rest period violations;
10 \$734,550.0 for failure to timely pay wages during employment; \$734,550.00 in for failure to maintain
11 required payroll records; and \$367,275.00 for failure to reimburse business expenses. (*Id.*, ¶ 38.) These
12 calculations did not include duplicative penalties that Plaintiff's counsel anticipated would be
13 recovered as part of the Class claims, such as waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203 and wage
14 statement penalties under Labor Code § 226. (*Id.*)

15 b. Strengths and Weaknesses of Plaintiff's Claims and the Risks of Continued
16 Litigation.

17 Despite Defendant's significant potential exposure, Plaintiff's counsel recognized that there
18 are significant risks associated with proceeding with this case through class certification, trial, and
19 likely appeals. As with all class actions, this is a complex case that raises difficult management and
20 proof issues. Accordingly, there is a significant risk that the Court may deny class certification. While
21 Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel were confident that Plaintiff's claims are fundamentally meritorious
22 and suitable for class-wide resolution, consideration of these risks factored into their decision to enter
23 into the Settlement at this point in the litigation. (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 39-62.)

24 As a preliminary matter, prior to mediation, Defendant disclosed that 237 of the 255 Class
25 Members had entered into arbitration agreements and asserted that these individuals should be
26 excluded from any potential class. Although Plaintiff's counsel strongly contested the enforceability
27 of these agreements, they also recognized that the existence of these agreements created a significant
28 risk that a significant number of Class Members could ultimately be precluded from participating in

1 the litigation. *See Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transportation*, 228 Cal.App.4th 1213 (2014). The risk
2 presented by the existence of these purported arbitration agreements affected each claim alleged by
3 Plaintiff. (Minne Decl, ¶ 41.)

4 Plaintiff's counsel also considered the specific risks associated with each of Plaintiff's primary
5 claims. For example, a significant portion of Defendant's estimated liability is based on Plaintiff's
6 meal period claim. Plaintiff contends that Class Members were often required to skip, delay, and
7 shorten their meal periods. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant unlawfully automatically deducted
8 30-minutes of time for meal periods, even where such meal periods were not recorded in Class
9 Members' time records. Defendant argued that that Plaintiff would be unable to certify a class because
10 its formal, written policies were facially compliant with California law. Defendant also maintained
11 that as a matter of practice it provided ample opportunity for Class Members to take meal periods, and
12 that if Class Members did not take compliant meal breaks, it is because they voluntarily chose not to
13 do so. Defendant also asserted that its practice of automatically deducting time for meal periods was
14 largely limited to the years preceding the filing of this lawsuit (i.e., 2018 -2021) Defendant further
15 asserted that questions of whether employees had received compliant meal periods, why such meal
16 periods were not taken, and whether such meal periods were voluntarily waived were individualized
17 issues that would bar certification. While Plaintiff's counsel strongly disagreed with Defendant's
18 arguments and factual contentions, they recognized that meal period claims have become increasingly
19 difficult to certify since *Brinker Restaurants Corp. v. Sup. Ct.*, 53 Cal.4th 1004 (2012), particularly in
20 cases where an employer's formal policies are facially compliant. (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 42-43.)

21 Plaintiff's counsel were also cognizant of the challenges associated with maintaining Plaintiff's
22 rest period claims on a class-wide basis. Plaintiff contends that Class Members were required to skip
23 their rest periods, and also had their rest periods interrupted by their supervisors. Plaintiff further
24 contends that Defendant required Class Members to stay on-site during their rest periods in a manner
25 that violated California law as set forth in *Augustus v. ABM Securities*, 2 Cal.5th 257, 270 (2016). As
26 with meal period claims, Defendant asserted that its formal written rest period policies were facially
27 compliant, that it provided employees with a rest period for every four hours worked or major fraction
28 thereof, and that as matter of practice Class Members were free to leave jobsites during their breaks.

1 Defendant likewise argued that whether Class Members had received a compliant rest period and the
2 reasons why Class Members failed to receive compliant rest periods raised individualized issues that
3 could not be certified. While Plaintiff’s counsel disagreed with Defendant’s positions, they also
4 recognized that rest period claims are inherently difficult to certify and prove, given that an employer
5 has no obligation to maintain records of rest periods. (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 44-45.)

6 Plaintiff also faced challenges related to certifying and proving liability for his minimum wage
7 and off-the-clock claims. Such claims were primarily based on Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant
8 engaged in rounding practices that were not neutral and resulted in the systematic underpayment of
9 wages to Class Members. Defendant contended that its rounding practices were facially neutral, and
10 therefore lawful under *See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 895 (2012).
11 Defendant also argued that stopped rounding employees’ time records in 2022. (*Id.*) While Plaintiff’s
12 counsel believes *Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC*, 11 Cal. 5th 58, 76 (2021) indicates that the
13 California Supreme Court will eventually find any form of rounding to be unlawful, they recognized
14 that *See’s Candy Shops, Inc.* remains good law for the time being. In addition to rounding, Plaintiff
15 also alleges that Defendant failed to pay Class Members all minimum wages and overtime
16 compensation owed due to its practice of pressuring Class Members to work off-the-clock. Defendant
17 asserted that its formal written policies regarding payment of wages were facially compliant, and that
18 Class Members were instructed to record all hours worked. Defendant also argued that individual
19 liability issues predominate, including: (1) whether each employee worked off-the-clock; and (2)
20 whether Defendant knew or should have known about each employee’s off-the-clock work. (*Id.*)
21 Moreover, given that these claims were based on off-the-clock work not reflected in Defendant’s time
22 records, Defendant argued that proving damages at trial would not be manageable. (Minne Decl., ¶¶
23 46-48.)

24 In addition to meal period, rest period, overtime, and minimum wage claims, Plaintiff also
25 contends that Defendant failed to reimburse Class Members for necessary business expenses, such as
26 use of their personal cell phones, vehicles, and tools. Defendant asserted that it reimbursed Class
27 Members for all such expenses, and that individualized inquiries as to why a Class Member failed to
28 receive reimbursement for certain expenses would predominate. (Minne Decl., ¶ 49.)

1 There are also substantial risks attached to Plaintiff’s claims for waiting time penalties and
2 wage statement penalties. Such claims are derivative of Plaintiff’s primary claims for meal period, rest
3 period, minimum wage and overtime violations. Thus, if certification is denied on the primary claims,
4 these derivative claims would also likely fail. Moreover, even if Plaintiff prevails on the underlying
5 claims, Plaintiff would still be required to show that Defendant’s conduct was willful in order to obtain
6 Labor Code § 203 penalties, a difficult prospect. *See, e.g., Choate v. Celite Corp.*, 215 Cal App. 4th
7 1460, 1468 (2013) (holding that “an employer’s reasonable, good faith belief that wages are not owed
8 may negate a finding of willfulness”). Wage statement claims have also seen varying treatment at the
9 appellate level because such claims have an element of discretion attached to them. *Cf., Jaimez v.*
10 *DAIOHS USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal.App.4th 1286 (2010) *with Price v. Starbucks Corp.*, 192 Cal.App.4th
11 1136 (2011). Accordingly, these derivative claims were extremely uncertain. (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 50-51.)

12 Plaintiff’s counsel also separately contemplated the numerous risks of proceeding with a
13 PAGA claim. First, the same defenses and merits-based risks associated with Plaintiff’s direct Labor
14 Code claims are also applicable to a PAGA claim. *See Green v. Lawrence Service Co.*, 2013 U.S. Dist.
15 LEXIS 109270, at *5, fn. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“whether each PAGA claims succeeds or fails is
16 determined by the merits of the substantive claims on which each is based.”) Second, informal
17 discovery indicates that Defendant had already rectified some of its most egregious practices before
18 the one-year limitations period applicable to PAGA. Third, although California law is clear that PAGA
19 actions need not satisfy class action requirements, there is currently a split in authority over whether
20 PAGA claims may nevertheless be stricken based on manageability concerns. *Cf. Wesson v. Staples*
21 *The Office Superstore*, 68 Cal.App.5th 746 (2021) *with Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc.*, 76
22 Cal.App.5th 685 (2022). Even if Plaintiff defeated any challenges to manageability, the Court could
23 ultimately exercise its discretion to find that the imposition of heightened civil penalties was
24 inappropriate, particularly if Plaintiff prevailed on his class claims. Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(2);
25 *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1122 (2012).³ The purported
26

27 ³ *See also, Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (reducing penalties by 97.5%); *Fleming v.*
28 *Covidien*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154590, *8-9 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (reducing potential PAGA penalties by over 80 percent);
Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs. et al., 384 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2019)(applying 67% and 80% reductions to
PAGA Penalties).

1 arbitration agreements also created significant uncertainty in light of the recent Supreme Court
2 decision in *Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana*, 142 S.Ct. 1906 (2022). (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 52-57.)

3 Finally, Plaintiff's counsel recognized the significant risk and expense generally associated
4 with continued litigation, trial, and possible appeals, all of which would substantially delay and reduce
5 any recovery by the Class Members. Even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification, proving the
6 amount of wages due to each Class Member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and extremely
7 uncertain proposition. In order to prove liability and damages, Plaintiff's counsel will need to request
8 and analyze thousands of pages of documents, obtain the Class Members' contact information, contact
9 them and obtain numerous declarations at great expense. Obtaining the cooperation of current
10 employees would also be difficult, given the likely reluctance to aid prosecution of a lawsuit against a
11 current employer. On the other hand, Defendant would likely be able to obtain the cooperation of its
12 current employees. This puts Plaintiff at a particular disadvantage in this case because 63% of the
13 Class (161 of the 255 Class Members) are current employees of Defendant. Moreover, even if Plaintiff
14 prevails at class certification and trial, possible appeals would substantially delay any recovery by the
15 Class. These risks are all obviated by the Settlement, which if approved by the Court will ensure that
16 class members receive timely relief without the risk of an unfavorable judgment. (Minne Decl., ¶ 59.)

17 Taking into account the specific strengths and weaknesses of each claim, and the unique risks
18 associated therewith, the general risks and significant costs associated with litigation this Action
19 through class certification, trial, and appeals, Plaintiff's counsel estimated that Defendant faced a risk-
20 adjusted liability of \$720,450.83 for Plaintiff's Class claims, and \$147,571.10 for Plaintiff's PAGA
21 claims. (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 43, 45, 48-51, 58, 60.)

22 Therefore, after considering the strengths and weaknesses of each claim, and the unique risks
23 associated therewith, the general risks of continue litigation, and the significant costs, expenses, and
24 delay that would result from continued litigation, it is clear that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and
25 adequate, and is in the best interest of the Class. (Minne Decl., ¶ 61.) Moreover, the Gross Settlement
26 Amount of \$775,564.00 – which represents 16.4% of the maximum value of the direct Class claims at
27 issue - falls within an acceptable range of recovery for this type of litigation given the strengths and
28 weaknesses of the case and the inhere costs and risks associated with class certification, representative

1 adjudication, trial, and/or appeals. *See, e.g., Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist.
2 LEXIS 78671, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (approving settlement amount representing approximately 10%
3 of the estimated actual damages to the class); *Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co.*, 306 F.R.D. 245,
4 256 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (approving settlement representing approximately 8.5% of the maximum
5 damages); *Avila v. Cold Spring Granite Co.*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130878 (E.D. Cal 2017)
6 (approving settlement where gross recovery was 11% of the maximum damages). (Minne Decl., ¶ 61.)

7 **D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable.**

8 The \$50,000.00 allocated for penalties under PAGA is fair and reasonable. PAGA is
9 fundamentally not intended to be compensatory in nature, but is instead intended to facilitate
10 enforcement of California’s labor laws by financing state activities and educating and deterring non-
11 compliance. *See* Cal. Labor Code § 2699(i); *Arias v. Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal. 4th 980; *Williams v. Sup. Ct.*, 3
12 Cal.5th 531, 546 (2017); *Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC*, 59 Cal.4th 348, 379 (2014).
13 Where, as here, the parties reach a substantial class-wide settlement providing employees with
14 monetary compensation for underlying Labor Code violations, many of PAGA’s underlying policy
15 objectives are satisfied. Indeed, the \$50,000.00 PAGA Payment (6.4% of the Gross Settlement
16 Amount) is well-within the range approved by California courts. *See Nordstrom Comm. Cases*, 186
17 Cal.App.4th 576, 589 (2010)(finding no abuse of trial court’s discretion in approval of release that
18 included PAGA claims but allocated \$0 to PAGA penalties); *Alcala v. Meyer Logistics, Inc.*, 2019 WL
19 4452961, *9 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2019) (settlement of claims for PAGA penalties representing 1.25%
20 of gross settlement amount was reasonable, as it “falls within the zero to two percent range for PAGA
21 claims approved by courts.”); *In re M.L. Stern Overtime Litig.*, 2009 WL 995864, *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
22 13, 2009) (approving PAGA settlement of 2%); *Hopson v. Hanesbrands, Inc.*, 2008 WL 3385452, *1
23 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009) (approving PAGA settlement of 0.3%). (Minne Decl., ¶ 62.)

24 **V. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED.**

25 Code of Civil Procedure § 382 provides that three basic requirements must be met in order to
26 sustain any class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class; (2) there must be a well-defined
27 community of interest in the question of law or fact affecting the parties to be represented; and (3)
28 certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e., proceeding as a class is

1 superior to other methods. *Fireside Bank v. Superior Court*, 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1089 (2007); *see also*
2 *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 326 (2004). Courts utilize a less stringent
3 standard for class certification during settlement. *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*,
4 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 859 (2003). The reason: “no trial is anticipated in a settlement class case, so the
5 case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be confronted.” *Id.*

6 As demonstrated below, all three requirements for certification of the Class as defined by the
7 Settlement are satisfied. Furthermore, Defendant has stipulated to certification of the proposed Class
8 for settlement purposes only. (Agreement, ¶ 12.1.)

9 **A. There is an Ascertainable Class.**

10 Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size
11 of the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. *See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal.App.3d
12 862, 873 (1983). In this case, all three considerations strongly favor class certification. Here, the Class
13 is defined as all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as hourly-paid and/or non-
14 exempt who worked for Defendant at any time from May 5, 2018, to May 5, 2023. (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.5,
15 1.12.) This provides a clear and definite scope for the proposed class.

16 Next, the class is sufficiently numerous. There is no magic number that satisfies the numerosity
17 requirement. Under the Federal Rules, the minimum number of a class is 100 individuals. Under
18 California law, that number is significantly less. *See e.g., Rose v. City of Haywood*, 126 Cal.App.3d
19 926, 934 (1981) (holding 42 class members sufficient to satisfy numerosity); *Bowles v. Superior Court*,
20 44 Cal.2d 574 (1955) (class with 10 members sufficiently numerous). Here, the estimated Class size
21 of 255 individuals plainly favors class certification. (Agreement, ¶¶ 4.1, 8.)

22 Finally, the question whether class members are easily identifiable turns on whether a plaintiff
23 can establish “the existence of an ascertainable class.” *Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.*, 67 Cal. 2d 695, 706
24 (1967). The existence of an ascertainable class in this case can be established through Defendant’s
25 payroll records, and the class definition is sufficiently specific to enable the parties, potential Class
26 Members and the Court to determine the parameters of the Class.

27 **B. The Class Shares a Well-Defined Community of Interest.**

1 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of
2 law and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
3 representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806. This case easily
4 satisfies all three requirements.

5 1. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate.

6 The commonality criterion requires the existence of common question of law or fact and is
7 generally established with the issues of predominance and typicality. *See Daar*, 67 Cal.2d 695, 706.
8 What is required is that a common question of fact or law exist which predominates over issues unique
9 to individual plaintiffs. The existence of individual issues or facts—generally present in any case
10 arising from employment—is not a bar to class certification as long as they do not render class
11 litigation unmanageable or predominate over the common issues. *See B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v.*
12 *Owens-Illinois, Inc.*, 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1354 (1987).

13 Here, Plaintiff’s claims present sufficient common issues of law and fact that predominate and
14 warrant class certification. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant prohibited employees from taking
15 compliant meal and rest periods, improperly rounded Class Members’ time records, and required Class
16 Members to perform work off-the-clock. These policies and practices meant that Defendant failed to
17 pay required meal period premiums, minimum wages, and overtime wages, and other related claims.
18 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s policies and practices were uniform as to all Class Members. Thus,
19 class treatment is appropriate.

20 2. Plaintiff’s Claims are Typical of the Class.

21 To satisfy the typicality requirement, California law does not require that Plaintiff have claims
22 identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class representative is whether
23 other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not
24 unique to the named plaintiff, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course
25 of conduct. *See Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 (2007). The typicality
26 requirement for a class representative refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the representative,
27 and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. *See Id.*

1 Here, Plaintiff alleges that his claims are based on the same legal theories, arise out of the same
2 unlawful policies and practices, and seek the same relief. Because Plaintiff's claims are based on the
3 same alleged conduct and business practices as the claims of the other Class Members, the typicality
4 requirement is satisfied.

5 3. Plaintiff and his Counsel Will Fairly and Adequately Represent the Class.

6 The question of adequacy of representation "depends on whether the plaintiff's attorney
7 qualifies to conduct the proposed litigation in the plaintiff's interest or not antagonistic to the interests
8 of the class." *McGee v. Bank of America*, 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450 (1976). Here, these considerations
9 are satisfied. Class Counsel are well-regarded and accomplished lawyers who are qualified and
10 experienced in employment-related, class-action litigation, and who do not have any conflicts of
11 interest which would impede their representation of the Class. (Minne Decl., ¶¶ 66-71; Ghosh Decl.,
12 ¶¶ 2-7.) Furthermore, because Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of other Class Members, and are
13 not based on unique circumstances that might jeopardize the claims of the class, there is no antagonism
14 of interests between Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff is also fully aware of his duties as the class
15 representative, and will vigorously and adequately represent the interests of the Class. (Gonzalez
16 Decl., ¶¶ 5-13.) Therefore, the adequacy requirement is satisfied.

17 **C. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.**

18 Under the circumstances, proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this
19 dispute, as the Class Members and the court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would
20 serve as the only means to deter and redress the alleged violations. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23
21 Cal.4th 429, 434 (2000) (relevant considerations include the probability that each class member will
22 come forward to prove her or her separate claim and whether the class approach would actually serve
23 to deter and redress the alleged wrongdoing). Further, individual actions arising out of the same
24 operative facts would unduly burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results. Therefore, class
25 action proceedings are superior to individual litigation.

26 **VI. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE.**

27 Trial courts have "wide latitude" in assessing the value of attorneys' fees and their decisions
28 will "not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion." *Lealao v. Beneficial Cal, Inc.*,

1 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000). California law provides that attorney fee awards should be equivalent
2 to fees paid in the legal marketplace to compensate for the result achieved and risk incurred. *Id.* at 47.
3 In cases where class members present claims against a common fund and the defendant agrees a
4 percentage of the fund as part of the settlement, use of the percentage method is appropriate. *Id.* at 32.

5 Historically, courts have awarded fees as high as fifty percent (50%) of the settlement,
6 depending on the circumstances of the case. *Newberg on Class Actions*, § 14.03 (4th Ed.); *see also In*
7 *re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.*, 526 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1981) (awarding attorneys' fees in the amount
8 of 45% of the \$7.3 million settlement); *Beech Cinema, Inc. v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.*
9 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 480 F.Supp. 1195 (awarding approximately 53% of the settlement as attorneys' fees).
10 California courts routinely approve class action attorneys' fee awards averaging around one-third of
11 the recovery. *In re Consumer Privacy Cases*, 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 558 at n.13 (2009); *Chavez v.*
12 *Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 n.11 (lower court found 20 to 40 percent range of
13 contingency fee in marketplace was appropriate in class actions.)

14 Here, the requested attorneys' fees of \$271,517.40, which is 35% of the common fund, is
15 disclosed to Class Members in the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement. (Agreement, Exh. A.)
16 The requested fee was freely negotiated, is common in the legal marketplace, and is not opposed by
17 Defendant. Furthermore, the fee sharing agreement between Plaintiff's counsel was fully disclosed to
18 Plaintiff, who provided written consent to the arrangement. (Minne Decl., ¶ 65; Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 14.)
19 The Motion for Final Approval will elaborate on the nature of the legal services provided and will also
20 support Class Counsel's request for the reimbursement of litigation costs not to exceed \$30,000.00.
21 (Minne Decl., ¶ 64.)

22 **VII. THE PROPOSED SERVICE AWARD IS REASONABLE.**

23 Plaintiffs in class action lawsuits are eligible for reasonable incentive payments as
24 compensation "for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of
25 the class." *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412 (2010). Courts routinely
26 grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class
27 representative, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class and are appropriate
28 given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. *See Van Vranken v. Atlantic*

1 *Richfield Co.*, 901 F.Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (approving \$50,000.00 enhancement); *In re*
2 *Online DVD Rental*, 779 F.3d 934, 947-948 (9th Cir. 2014) (approving incentive award 417 times
3 larger than individual payments where incentive award made up a mere .17% of the settlement);
4 *Gaudin v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc.*, 2015 WL 7454183, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (finding
5 service award of \$15,000 to be “fair and reasonable”); *Miller v. CEVA Logistics USA, Inc.*, 2015 WL
6 4730176, at * 9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2015)(approving service award of \$15,000 to each plaintiff); *Glass*
7 *v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.*, 2007 WL 221862 at *16 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving payments of \$25,000
8 to each named plaintiff); *In re Heritage Bond Litigation*, 2005 WL 1594403 at *18 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
9 (awarding incentive payments between \$5,000 and \$18,000).

10 Plaintiff initiated this litigation on behalf of his former co-workers who can now collect
11 monetary payment from the Settlement. Plaintiff invested substantial time and effort into litigation
12 including his own research, reviewing documents, and extensive discussions with Class Counsel.
13 (Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 4-10.) Further, the requested Service Award is extremely reasonable given the
14 benefit gained by other Class Members. The requested Service Award of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff is
15 disclosed to Class Members in the Class Notice. (Agreement, Exh. A.) For these reasons, Plaintiff
16 requests that a Service Payment of \$7,500.00 be preliminarily approved by the Court. (Minne Decl., ¶
17 63; Ghosh Decl., ¶ 14; Gonzalez Decl., ¶ 11.)

18 **VIII. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE, AND OPT-OUT AND OBJECTION**
19 **PROCEDURES SATISFY DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS**

20 “The principal purpose of notice to the class is the protection of the integrity of the class action
21 process.” *Cartt v. Superior Court* , 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 970 (1975). The notice ““must fairly apprise
22 the class members of the terms of the proposed compromise and of the options open to the
23 dissenting class members.”” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 251 (2001).
24 Additionally, the notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage
25 of the class members. *Cartt*, 50 Cal.App.3d at 974.

26 The Parties have selected Phoenix Settlement Administrators to administer the Settlement.
27 (Minne Decl., ¶ 30; Agreement ¶ 1.2.) Prior to finalizing the Settlement, Class Counsel also obtained
28 a administration bids from CPT Group, Inc., however Phoenix Settlement Administrators was

1 ultimately selected as the Administrator because its bid was lower and, consequently, would result in
2 a greater recovery by Participating Class Members. (*Id.*, ¶ 29, Exh. 3-4; Declaration of Jodey Lawrence
3 [“Lawrence Decl.”] Exh. B.) Phoenix Settlement Administrators has extensive experience in
4 administering class action and PAGA settlements, and has procedures in place to protect the security
5 of class data as well as adequate insurance in the event of a data breach or defalcation of settlement
6 funds. (Lawrence Decl., ¶¶ 5-11, Exh. A.) The Parties and their counsel do not have any financial
7 interest in Phoenix Settlement Administrators that would create a conflict of interest. (Minne Decl., ¶
8 73; Ghosh Decl., ¶ 15; Lawrence Decl., ¶ 4; Moore Decl., ¶ 2; Whitehead Decl., ¶ 2.)

9 The Parties have jointly drafted a Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”), based
10 on this Court’s model, which will be sent to Class Members in both in both English and Spanish.
11 (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.11 7.4.2, Exh. A.) The Class Notice describes the nature of the lawsuit, the key terms
12 of the Settlement, the scope of the Released Class Claims and Released PAGA Claims the scope of
13 the claims released, Class Members’ estimated Individual Settlement Payment and Individual PAGA
14 Payment, Class Members’ total Workweeks during the Class Period, and Aggrieved Employees’ total
15 pay PAGA Pay Periods. (Agreement, Exh. A.) The Class Notice also informs Class Members how to
16 opt-out of the Settlement, object to the Settlement, and challenge their reported workweeks. (*Id.*) The
17 Class Notice will indicate that the Court has determined only that there is sufficient evidence to suggest
18 that the proposed settlement might be fair, adequate and reasonable, and a final determination of such
19 issues will be made at the final hearing. (*Id.*) The Class Notice also include instructions on how to
20 obtain all relevant Settlement documents, including posting of the Final Judgment, and informs Class
21 Members of their right to attend the final approval hearing. (*Id.*) The Class Notice also advises Class
22 Members that they should monitor the Court’s website, the Administrator’s website, or contact Class
23 Counsel to verify the time and date for the Final Approval hearing. (*Id.*)

24 No later than 30 days after the Court grants Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, Defendant
25 shall provide the Administrator with the Class Data, comprised of Class Members’ names, last-known
26 mailing addresses, Social Security numbers, and number of Class Period Workweeks and PAGA Pay
27 Periods. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 1.8, 4.2.) No later than 14 calendar days after receiving the Class Data from
28 Defendant, the Administrator shall mail copies of the Class Notice to all Class Members via regular

1 First Class U.S. Mail. (*Id.*, ¶ 7.4.2.) Before mailing the Class Notice to Class Members, the
2 Administrator shall perform a search based on the National Change of Address Database to update
3 and correct any known or identifiable address changes. (*Id.*)

4 No later than 3 business days after receipt of any Class Notice as undeliverable, the Administer
5 shall re-mail such returned Class Notices to the forwarding address provided by the USPS. (*Id.*, ¶
6 7.4.3.) If no forwarding address is provided, the Administrator shall search for a current address using
7 all readily available resources, such as skip tracing, and re-mail the Class Notice to the most current
8 address obtained. (*Id.*) The Administrator has no obligation to make further attempts to locate or send
9 Class Notice to Class Members whose Class Notice is returned by the USPS a second time. (*Id.*)

10 Class Members shall have 60 days after the mailing of the Class Notice to submit request for
11 exclusions, objection, or workweek dispute by fax, email, or mail. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 1.43, 7.5.1., 7.6, 7.7.2.)
12 Further, the Response Deadline shall be extended by 14 days for all Class Members whose Class
13 Notices are re-mailed. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 1.43, 7.4.4.)

14 Direct mail notice to Class Members' last known addresses is the best possible notice under
15 the circumstances. *See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950); *Eisen*
16 *v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 173-176 (1974). Furthermore, the Class Notice comports with
17 the requirements of California Rules of Court, Rules 3.769 and 3.766. Pursuant to Rule 3.769(f), the
18 class notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for class members
19 to follow in filing written objections to it and arranging to appear at the hearing and state objections to
20 the proposed settlement. Cal. R. Ct. 3.769(f). Rule 3.766 further requires that the class notice include
21 (1) a brief explanation of the case, including the basic contentions and denials of the parties; (2) a
22 procedure for the class member to follow in requesting exclusion, and a statement that the Court will
23 exclude the class member from the class if he or she so requests by the specified deadline; (3) a
24 statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will bind all class members who do not request
25 exclusion; (4) a statement that any class member who does not request exclusion may, if the class
26 member so desires, object and enter an appearance through counsel. The proposed Class Notice satisfies
27 each of these requirements. *See Agreement, Exh. A.*

1 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court appoint Phoenix Settlement
2 Administrators as the Settlement Administrator and direct the mailing of the Class Notice to the Class
3 Members in the manner outlined and based on the proposed deadlines as described herein and set forth
4 in the Agreement.

5 **IX. CONCLUSION**

6 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court: (1) grant
7 Preliminary Approval of the Settlement; (2) approve the Class Notice and plan for distribution of the
8 Class Notice; (3) provisionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only; and (4) schedule a
9 hearing on Final Approval of the Settlement.

10 Respectfully submitted,

11 Dated: May 16, 2023

PARKER & MINNE, LLP

12
13 By: _____


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