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7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs  
8 JOHN DOE, DAVID GUDEMAN  
9 AND PAOLA CORREA

10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA  
11 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

12  
13 JOHN DOE, DAVID GUDEMAN, and  
14 PAOLA CORREA, on behalf of the State of  
California and aggrieved employees,

15 Plaintiffs,

16 vs.

17 GOOGLE, INC., ALPHABET, INC.  
18 ADECCO USA INC., ADECCO GROUP  
NORTH AMERICA and ROES 1 through 10,

19 Defendants.  
20  
21  
22

Case No. CGC-16-556034

**BAKER DECLARATION IN SUPPORT  
OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES,  
COSTS, AND AN INCENTIVE  
PAYMENT**

**(BAKER FEE DECLARATION)**

Department: 304 (COMPLEX)  
Judge: Hon. Curtis E.A. Karnow  
Hearing Date: June 25, 2018  
Time: 3:00 p.m.

Complaint Filed: December 20, 2016  
Trial Date: November 6, 2018

23  
24 I, Chris Baker, declare as follows:

25 1. I am counsel of record for the Plaintiffs in this action. I have personal knowledge  
26 of the following facts.  
27  
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ELECTRONICALLY  
**FILED**  
*Superior Court of California,  
County of San Francisco*  
**06/01/2018**  
Clerk of the Court  
BY: VANESSA WU  
Deputy Clerk

## Attorney Background

2. As a lawyer, I have specialized in labor and employment law for about 23 years. I am currently a shareholder of Baker Curtis & Schwartz, P.C. Prior to that, I was the owner of the Baker & Schwartz Law Practice (known initially as the Baker Law Practice), which I founded in March 2013. From November 2008 through February 2013, I was a partner and then an equity partner at Nixon Peabody LLP, an AmLaw 100 Firm that – at the time – had more than 700 attorneys. From 1996 through November 2008, I was an associate and then a partner at Thelen Marin Johnson & Bridges (in all its iterations, ending with Thelen LLP), another AmLaw 100 firm. In 1995 and 1996, I was an associate at Littler Mendelson. In 1994-1995, I was a judicial clerk for Judge Bailey Brown of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Prior to that, I attended law school at the University of Cincinnati, where I was a Student Articles Editor of the Cincinnati Law Review, and where I externed for Judge David Nelson of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

3. I have two partners/shareholders, Deborah Schwartz and Mike Curtis. In 2014, Schwartz joined the practice and the firm became Baker & Schwartz, P.C. Deborah Schwarz has practiced labor and employment law since 2000. She was an associate at Thelen LLP, and an associate and partner at Nixon Peabody LLP. In 2015, Curtis joined Baker & Schwartz and the firm soon became Baker Curtis & Schwartz, P.C. as a partner. Curtis has practiced labor and employment law since 2007 and was previously a senior associate at Nixon Peabody. We are all very experienced, and our practice is not leveraged. There is very little of the “rework” that occurs at leveraged firms. That said, we do work on one another’s cases, and we do communicate, strategize and provide input with respect to one another’s work. We work together on large cases like this one.

4. At various times and in various years, all three of us have been rated “Super Lawyers” by our peers.

5. As lawyers, our practice has included, in significant respect, the defense (and now the prosecution) of complex wage and hour class, collective, PAGA, and qui tam actions. AS defense lawyers, we have represented corporate clients such as the Hertz Corporation (*see, e.g.*,

1 *Hertz Corporation v. Friend* (2010) 559 U.S. 77), Kaiser Permanente, the Golden State Warriors,  
2 Oracle, Solar City, Sharper Image, MediaNews Corp., American Laser Centers, and Redfin in  
3 employment class actions. As plaintiffs lawyers, we have prosecuted (or are prosecuting)  
4 employment class actions or PAGA cases against companies such as Bank of America, One West  
5 Bank, Chase, Fidelity, PennyMac, Mixpanel, and, of course, Google and Adecco.

#### 6 **Attorney Rates**

7 6. Baker Curtis & Schwartz focuses on representing employees in individual, class,  
8 collective, PAGA, and other qui tam matters. While we primarily work on a contingency basis,  
9 we also represent employees – mainly senior executives and high income employees – and  
10 corporations on an hourly basis.

11 7. From the inception of work on this case through 2017, our standard hourly rates  
12 were \$750 an hour for me (Baker), \$615 an hour for Schwartz, and \$550 an hour for Curtis. In  
13 2018, we raised our rates to \$800.00 an hour for me, \$655 an hour for Schwartz, and \$580 an  
14 hour for Curtis. These are the rates we currently charge new clients, as well as existing clients for  
15 new matters. I am confident these rates are competitive because, with limited exceptions (mainly  
16 with respect to Schwartz's work conducting workplace investigations), these are the rates that are  
17 actually paid to us by individuals and corporate clients for hourly matters, including litigation.

18 8. While at Nixon Peabody, I was a deputy department head of Nixon's labor group  
19 (consisting, at the time of my service, of more than 70 attorneys). In that position, I received  
20 information on standard hourly rates generated by law firm consultants, banks, and other sources.  
21 The hourly rates varied by geographic area. For example, a partner in the Bay Area would have a  
22 much higher rate than a partner in upstate New York. In my position as deputy, I advised on  
23 hourly rates for labor and employment attorneys in the group. In 2012-2013, the prevailing  
24 market rates for Bay Area labor and employment attorneys at firms comparable to Nixon ranged  
25 from \$500 to \$800 an hour. This is consistent with the case law. As explained in *Laffitte II*, in  
26 2002, hourly rates ranged from \$750 to \$875 an hour, and in 2012, hourly rates ranged from \$775  
27 to \$950 an hour. *Id.* at 152.

28 9. Based on my research, including (but not limited to) conversations with corporate

1 clients (who retain different firms), competitors, and colleagues in the defense bar, I understand  
2 that those rates have continued to increase

3 10. In addition, because I prepare fee applications in both class action and individual  
4 cases, I keep abreast of the market rates for fees. This includes reviewing fee applications in  
5 other cases, including expert declarations, and reviewing market research such as the “Real Rate  
6 Report” by CEB and Wolters Kluwer. According to press reports, and consistent with  
7 understanding, LexisNexis Counsel Link’s 2018 Legal Management Report found an 8% increase  
8 in rates in 2017 among the 50 largest law firms, which includes Paul Hastings, Morgan Lewis,  
9 Latham Watkins, Kirkland & Ellis, Reed Smith, Goodwin Proctor, Covington & Burlington, and  
10 Sidley Austin. We have been adverse to all of these firms in the last two years.

11 11. As a contingency fee lawyer, I represent many clients where I take a percentage of  
12 any recovery in the case. I am, by necessity, keenly aware of the market for these cases, and  
13 communicate with other plaintiff’s attorneys about their contingency fees (or learn about offered  
14 percentages from potential clients). In addition, when I represent defendants, I sometimes learn a  
15 plaintiff’s attorney’s contingency fee percentage in the course of negotiating a settlement.  
16 Currently, most plaintiff-side employment attorneys who work on a contingency basis for private  
17 clients charge 40% of the eventual recovery. Some start as low as 33%. Others go as high as  
18 48%. I typically (though not always) enter into escalating fee deals with clients that start at 35%.

#### 19 **Time Spent on this Case**

20 12. I am the primary attorney on this case and have done the vast majority of the work.  
21 Nevertheless, the case is large and it has been aggressively litigated. Accordingly, it has taken all  
22 three of us to litigate it.

23 13. We keep contemporaneous time records at our firm and record our time in the  
24 ordinary course of business.

25 14. In the course of preparing this motion, I reviewed and analyzed these time records.  
26 While doing so, I attempted to identify and remove duplicative or erroneous entries. I also  
27 attempted, where possible, to segregate the entries to exclude time spent on work unrelated to the  
28 claims released by the settlement.

1           15.     After removing duplicative and erroneous time entries, and through May 31, 2018,  
2 our records evidence 325 separate entries and show that we have spent approximately 682 hours  
3 on this case. These numbers are consistent with my experience. With respect to the claims  
4 associated with the current settlement, a (very brief) summary is as follows:

5           16.     I began working on this case more than two years ago, in April 2016. After initial  
6 settlement efforts failed, John Doe filed his initial PAGA complaint in December 2016. In  
7 February 2017, and after research and investigation to ensure the claims were viable, I notified  
8 the LWDA that Google requires all its employees and temporary workers to sign a “confidential”  
9 “Adult Content Liability Release.” As explained in the pleadings on file in this action, as well the  
10 documents provided in support of the Joint Motion for Approval, under Google’s non-disclosure  
11 (NDA) agreements, policies and practices then in effect, the “confidential” nature of the Liability  
12 Release meant it could never be shared with anyone. The Release also advised employees that  
13 they may be exposed to “sensitive ‘adult’ content” and that they “hereby release Google and its  
14 subsidiaries and affiliates from any and all liability associated with having this material present in  
15 the work environment, including but not limited to claims of harassment, hostile work  
16 environment, and discrimination.”

17           17.     Following Plaintiffs’ PAGA notice, and as explained in the Joint Motion, Google  
18 rescinded the Release, declared it non-confidential, and instituted a new, non-confidential, policy.  
19 Following a dispute about the sufficiency of Google’s cure, as well the expiration of the differing  
20 administration exhaustion periods (which Google refused to waive), on April 28, 2017, Plaintiffs  
21 filed their Third Amended Complaint (3AC). Google demurred to the 3AC, which was granted as  
22 to the Labor Code § 232.5 claim related to the Liability Release and denied as to the § 432.5  
23 claim.

24           18.     Discovery has also been contested in this case. As it relates to the settled claims,  
25 in January 2017, Plaintiffs sought discovery concerning Google’s employment of employees  
26 working at other Alphabet subsidiaries. Google refused to respond. My meet and confer efforts  
27 were unsuccessful, and eventually I prepared and filed a motion to compel responses to this  
28 discovery (among other things). This motion was taken off calendar when the case was

1 transferred to the complex department. Eventually (in October 2017), Google provided a  
2 supplemental response concerning this discovery.

3 19. In June 2017, Plaintiffs sought discovery concerning the Liability Release claims  
4 from both Adecco and Google, as well as discovery relevant to Correa's claim that both Google  
5 and Adecco were her "joint employers." Defendants generally refused to respond to this  
6 discovery as well. I again met and conferred with Google's counsel. Eventually, Plaintiffs  
7 moved to compel Google's response to certain of this discovery as it relates to the Liability  
8 Release claims. In December 2017, the Court granted this motion.

9 20. In August 2017, Plaintiffs propounded discovery concerning the integrity of the  
10 judicial process as it relates to Google's authorization under the law and its own policies to access  
11 the Court's, Plaintiffs' counsel, and Plaintiffs' "User Data" in connection with this litigation, and  
12 whether Google had actually accessed this "User Data" (an electronic form of surveillance  
13 analogous to, but exponentially more intrusive than, the surveillance that is the subject to Form  
14 Interrogatory 13.1). Google refused to respond to this discovery, leading to additional meet and  
15 confer efforts and a supplemental (but still incomplete) response in November 2017.

16 21. In September 2017, Google served discovery on Plaintiffs related to the Liability  
17 Release claims. Plaintiffs responded to this discovery.

18 22. In October 2017, Plaintiffs served additional discovery on Google concerning its  
19 employment of Correa and other contingent workers, as well as its possession of employment  
20 documents signed by Plaintiffs. In response, Google (eventually) produced an NDA signed by  
21 Correa in the applicable limitations period that included the Liability Release.

22 23. There has also been motion practice on the merits of the settled claims. In late  
23 November 2017, Google moved for judgment on the pleadings as the Liability Release Claims  
24 under Labor Code § 432.5. Plaintiffs opposed the motion. In December 2017, the Court ruled in  
25 Plaintiffs' favor.

26 24. Following the Court's December 2017 rulings, Plaintiffs and Google agreed to  
27 mediate the matter. Between January and March 2018, Google voluntarily provided my firm with  
28 extensive information concerning the PAGA claims in preparation for mediation.

1           25.     In February 2018, in light of certain rulings in the *Doe* and *Moniz* cases evidencing  
2 that resolution of these cases was not near, my firm and prepared and filed a writ petition seeking  
3 a reversal of the Court's *Garmon* preemption rulings, including as it relates to the Labor Code §  
4 232.5 claims associated with the Liability Release. Google filed a preliminary opposition to this  
5 petition.

6           26.     The parties mediated the case on March 22, 2018. As of the date of the mediation,  
7 the Court of Appeal had not yet ruled on the writ. On March 29, 2018, the Court of Appeals  
8 would deny the writ petition on the sole basis that it was timely.

9           27.     At the March 22, 2018 mediation, the parties reached a Memorandum of  
10 Agreement resolving the Liability Release claims. Subsequently, we negotiated and drafted a  
11 long-form agreement. We also drafted and filed the Joint Motion for Approval and the  
12 supporting papers presently before the Court.

13                   **Discount and Exclusion Analysis and Summary of Time Spent**

14           28.     My analysis of our time records show that approximately 229 of the hours  
15 expended on this case, in my view, cannot be reasonably attributed to prosecuting the claims  
16 subject to settlement. Items of excluded time are time spent combating Google's attempt to the  
17 expand the scope of the proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board (and thus buttress  
18 its *Garmon* preemption argument), time spent on discovery solely associated with *Garmon*  
19 preemption of the primary NDA claims, discovery and motion practice concerning catalyst fees  
20 for the primary NDA claims, and motion practice, settlement efforts, and discovery requests and  
21 responses directed solely towards Adecco and related to the Adecco claims.

22           29.     Of the 453 hours that are potentially relevant to the Settlement, approximately 59  
23 of them are properly attributed only to the Liability Release claims against Google. This work  
24 includes legal research, drafting the initial PAGA notice and disputing the cure, opposing the  
25 motion for judgment on the pleadings, seeking and moving for discovery associated solely with  
26 the Liability Release as to Google, negotiating the long form settlement, and research and  
27 preparing the joint motion for approval. Of these 59 hours, approximately fifty were spent by me  
28 and nine were spent by Schwartz. The fees associated with this work comes to \$43,758.

1           30.     The remaining 394 hours concern other work on the case that furthered the  
2 prosecution of the settled claims, as well as the other claims against both Adecco and Google.  
3 This time is not subject to reasonable segregation. This work includes legal research,  
4 investigation, client communications, preparing the 3AC, other discovery requests and responses  
5 (including as to joint employer liability), discovery motion practice centered on all the claims,  
6 motion practice concerning both the NDA and Liability Release claims (such as opposing  
7 Google’s demurrer to the 3AC), preparing for and attending court conferences, drafting the writ  
8 petition (which sought reversal of the Court’s *Garmon* ruling related to the Liability Release §  
9 232.5 claim *and* the other NDA claims), and preparing for and attending the March 22, 2018  
10 mediation. About three hundred and fifty one (351) of these 394 hours were spent by me, thirty-  
11 eight (38) were spent by Schwartz (primarily on legal research and reviewing and revising  
12 pleadings and motions), and five were spent by Curtis (primarily on the writ petition). The total  
13 fees associated with this intertwined work is \$297,677.

14           31.     In deciding how best to “value” the intertwined fees, I thought it made the most  
15 sense to attribute 25% of these fees to the settled claims for lodestar cross-check purposes. This  
16 is because there are four main claims in this case: the “primary NDA claims” pled against Google  
17 and Adecco (claims 1 and 2) and the “release claims” also pled against Google and Adecco  
18 (claims 3 and 4). The time is clearly intertwined because sometimes the same act – such as  
19 attending a case management conference – furthers all the claims. The claims themselves are  
20 intertwined in the sense that the Liability Release claims include an “NDA claim” under Labor  
21 Code § 232.5.

22           32.     Applying this reasoning, our “lodestar” for purposes of the cross-check is  
23 \$118,177.25. Checking this lodestar against the requested percentage recovery yields a multiplier  
24 of 2.93.

25                   **Preclusion of Other Employment and Contingent Nature of Case**

26           33.     My firm has taken this case on contingency and are advancing its costs.

27           34.     Since filing the PAGA notice asserting the Liability Release claims, my firm has declined  
28 to take on more than 200 potential matters. (We make records in client inquiries for conflict-of-



1 interest purposes.) While we would decline to handle many of these matters regardless of the  
2 circumstances, a significant number of them were either hourly matters or had merit as contingency  
3 cases. We nevertheless declined these opportunities (and revenue) due to bandwidth constraints  
4 caused by the time and energy required of this case. In short, this matter has undoubtedly  
5 precluded us from taking on other cases.

#### 6 **Costs**

7 35. In addition, in calculating our hard litigation costs with respect to this settlement,  
8 we faced the “intertwined” problem. Our “total” hard litigation costs for this case is \$28,452.30.  
9 If the Court seeks an itemized cost report and backup receipts, we can provide them. A general  
10 breakdown of costs, though, is as follows:

11 <b>Category</b>	12 <b>Amount</b>
13 Pleadings and Other Filing Fees	14 \$3,074.29
15 Court Reporter Fees	16 \$3,820.88
17 Postage and Overnight Delivery	18 \$221.02
19 Travel	20 \$185.57
21 Legal Research (not including research covered 22 by firm overhead)	23 \$610.40
24 Mediation Services	25 \$19,250
26 <b>Total</b>	27 \$28,327.30

28 36. In the course of preparing this motion, I reviewed the itemized costs, and I  
excluded costs that are clearly unrelated to the present settlement (such as the separation  
mediation with Mark Rudy that only involved Adecco). Costs associated only with settled claims  
(such as the cost of filings involving Google’s motion for judgment on the pleadings), I included.  
Costs that could not be clearly allocated to one claim or another, I discounted by 75%. As a result

1 of this process, the costs related to the settled claims comes to **\$7,207.50**. Plaintiffs request that  
2 this amount be deducted from the common fund as reimbursement of litigation costs.

3 **Incentive Payments**

4 37. All of the named Plaintiffs in this case have actively supported it. They have been  
5 responsive. They have been communicative. They have asked very good questions and they  
6 understand the case. They have also risked a lot. It is scary to sue Google, and this is a high-  
7 profile case. John Doe attended the Google mediation and both Correa and Gudeman were  
8 available throughout the day. (Correa would later attend the Adecco mediation.) They have all  
9 reviewed the documents in this case. They have responded to discovery and provided evidentiary  
10 support to the motion practice and otherwise. None of these plaintiffs will “benefit financially”  
11 from this settlement in any meaningful sense, yet they have obtained a substantial payment to the  
12 State of California. Moreover, through their efforts, they have changed Google’s behavior, forced  
13 it to announce a new policy, and rescinded more than 10,000 releases signed by their fellow co-  
14 workers, all of which purported to require them to waive important rights.

15 38. I fully support their request for modest incentive payments of \$1000 each.

16 I declare, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that the  
17 foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 1<sup>st</sup> day of June, 2018, in San Francisco, California.

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20 Chris Baker  
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